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RECONCEPTUALIZING THE JOINT
DEFENSE DOCTRINE
Deborah Stavile Barrel*
"A common defense often gives strength against a common attack."'
INTRODUCTION
T HE shape of prosecutions in the late twentieth century suggests
that prosecutors believe "the more, the merrier." The Depart-
ment of Justice's focus on concerted conduct involving narcotics distri-
bution and white collar crime results in a fair degree of frequency of
multiple co-defendants charged in a single indictment. One grand jury
investigation explores the possible criminal responsibility of several
targets. A single trial typically determines the liability of all indicted.
In such instances, each individual's fate depends upon his ability to
join with co-defendants to mount a coordinated counterattack on the
government's proof.
Whether a trial involves a single defendant or multiple defendants,
a fair trial must be assured to each. Since inconsistent defenses con-
demn one another to failure, a fair trial requires that co-defendants
have an unpenalized opportunity to coordinate the defense. Fre-
quently, co-defendants find it in their interest to exchange informa-
tion, pool labor, and launch a uniform theory to rebuff the
prosecution's legal attack. While information gathering is critical to
mounting a defense, there are few opportunities for formal discovery
in criminal cases. Joint defense groups facilitate the voluntary ex-
change of information and allow coordination among co-defendants.
Confidentiality of communications is essential to joint defense
groups. Communications in pursuit of a joint defense will not occur if
the prosecution is able to discover their content. Recognizing this,
courts have protected the confidentiality of these communications2
under a doctrine commonly known as the joint defense privilege or
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Touro Law School. J.D., N.Y.U. School
of Law 1979, and former Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of
New York. I am grateful for the research assistance of Touro Law students Daniel
Tucker and Joseph Norton. I also thank Bruce A. Green and Randolph N. Jonakait
for their comments on earlier drafts, and extend thanks to Wendy L. Addiss, Esq., for
her counsel.
1. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting
that confidentiality protection applies to criminal proceedings); United States v.
Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding this communication protected in
a criminal proceeding). But see Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Sweeney, 29 F-3d
120, 124 (4th Cir. 1994) (declining to extend this protection in a civil proceeding).
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the common interest rule.3 Although this protection was developed to
protect and promote the litigation posture of the multiple co-defend-
ants, its present theoretical conception, as part of the attorney-client
privilege, has transmogrified it into one of the sharpest arrows in the
prosecution's quiver. As all defense parties know, defection is a com-
mon event, and today's co-defendant frequently turns into tomorrow's
prosecution witness. A unified defense shared by separately repre-
sented co-parties raises vexatious questions concerning the ethical
propriety of continued representation and cross-examination of defec-
tors when a joint defense member withdraws to testify as a witness for
the government.
Prosecutors contend that the defector is entitled to preserve the
confidentiality of his communications to the joint defense group even
at the expense of the remaining members. The argument posed is that
lawyers for the co-defendants owe the defector a duty of confidential-
ity, thereby prohibiting cross-examination based on his confidential
joint defense communications. The argument continues that the law-
yers also owe their clients continuing to trial a duty of undivided loy-
alty.4  Prosecutors conclude therefore, that the lawyers for co-
defendants continuing to trial face an actual conflict of interest be-
tween the duty of loyalty and vigorous representation owed the client
standing trial and the duty of confidentiality owed the testifying gov-
ernment witness. 5 Accordingly, prosecutors contend that disqualifica-
tion is appropriate. Currently, whenever a joint defense member
withdraws to cooperate with the government, the joint defense doc-
trine threatens to detonate the defense by disqualifying the defense
lawyers and denying the defense the use of information gathered from
the defector during the joint defense effort.6
These significant threats chill joint defense groups from forming.7
The present construction of the joint defense privilege burdens the
constitutionally protected right of multiple co-defendants to pursue a
3. See Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 243; Daniel J. Capra, Attorney-Client Privilege
When Parties Share Interests, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 9, 1990, at 28 [hereinafter Capra, When
Parties Share Interests]. The common interest rule uses the "either" nomenclature
because the rule protects the confidentiality for any co-parties in the litigation, co-
plaintiffs as well as co-defendants.
4. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988) (upholding district
court decision not to allow defendant to be represented by attorney who already rep-
resented two co-defendants).
5. See United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (E.D.
Pa. July 30, 1992); United States v. Anderson, 790 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
6. See Ethical Implications of Joint Defense/Common Interest Agreements, 51
Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 115 (1996) [hereinafter, Ethical Implications].
7. The threats are real because no member of the joint defense group can prevent
a co-defendant from testifying as a government witness; the government retains con-
trol over this. The government may induce defection by either an attractive plea bar-
gain or a grant of immunity coupled with compelled testimony.
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coordinated defense in criminal cases.' Disqualification of one's
counsel of choice is bitter medicine to swallow and burdens the Sixth
Amendment's presumption in favor of retained counsel of choice.9
As a practical matter, it is expensive and psychologically difficult to
switch lawyers in the middle of a criminal case. Faced with the pros-
pect of disqualification of his lawyer, a defendant may lack the forti-
tude to stand trial, and may simply plead guilty. The defendant may
agree to sacrifice the use of the witness's joint defense communica-
tions on cross-examination to avoid having his lawyer disqualified.' 0
The client may be forced to compromise his confrontation rights or
lose the constitutional presumption in favor of counsel of choice. The
client may also lose the benefit of his bargain with the defector, who
now has the power to deprive the joint defense members of the use of
information he gave co-defendants to assist their defense.
Deterring the formation of joint defense groups, however, under-
mines the search for truth. Our adversary system demands balance to
achieve its truth-seeking mission and to function fairly. A trial be-
comes a lopsided contest when multiple co-defendants are discour-
aged from coordinating their defense and present unnecessarily
inconsistent defenses. Relegating defendants to uncoordinated and
inconsistent defenses bestows an unfair tactical advantage on the pros-
ecution because inconsistent defenses impair the credibility of the de-
fense as a whole. The presentation of inconsistent defenses also
lengthens a trial's duration, consuming more of a court's time than
otherwise would occur. Deterring joint defense groups causes ineffi-
ciency that our criminal justice system cannot afford, and undermines
the search for truth by thwarting information sharing between
defendants.
Although the joint defense doctrine was recognized to encourage
co-defendants to pursue coordinated defenses, its construction as part
of the attorney-client privilege now defeats this purpose. The strict
confidentiality requirements of the attorney-client privilege are the
source of the problem. Courts intend the joint defense privilege to
facilitate communications among co-defendants and to aid the prepa-
ration of their common legal defense rather than to serve as a weapon
in the hands of aggressive prosecutors. The current interpretation of
this protection discourages co-defendants from participating in joint
defense groups. It is appropriate to reexamine the conceptualization
8. United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 873 (10th Cir. 1995). In Jones, the court
assumed that the ability to plan and pursue a joint defense is incorporated into a
defendant's personal Sixth Amendment rights. The Jones court found no such viola-
tion where the defendant had the ability to communicate without interruption with
counsel for co-defendant, including interim counsel. Id
9. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (citing the presumption in
favor of counsel of choice).
10. See United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEGS 11447 (E.D.
Pa. July 30, 1992); United States v. Anderson, 790 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
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of the joint defense privilege to eliminate this incoherence. This Arti-
cle suggests a theory of protection for joint defense communication
that stands independently of the attorney-client privilege. This pos-
ited construction of the joint defense doctrine avoids the problems
that arise when a member withdraws from the joint defense group to
become a government witness. It redefines the scope of the duty of
confidentiality attaching to joint defense communications and tailors
it to meet the policy objectives supporting the protection.
While the thesis of this Article is that the joint defense privilege is
distinct from the attorney-client privilege, the joint defense doctrine
nevertheless shares some goals of that privilege and of the work prod-
uct doctrine. Despite these shared goals, this Article argues the joint
defense doctrine operates more in the nature of a doctrine of protec-
tion than a privilege and should be independently recognized as such.
This new doctrine is narrower and more flexible than the attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine. It would continue to
bar prosecutors from discovering statements by non-defecting joint
defense members, thus promoting the formation of joint defense ef-
forts. This Article demonstrates, however, that the joint defense doc-
trine should permit the use of a testifying defector's joint defense
communication during his cross-examination. Using a fiduciary duty
model, this Article explains that the joint defense doctrine should al-
low those who receive confidential joint defense communications to
exploit that information for their defense even when defection occurs.
By redefining the scope of confidentiality, all threats of attorney dis-
qualification disappear.
Part I of this Article explores joint defense arrangements. The part
first discusses how joint defense groups work, and then examines the
hostility toward joint defense groups. Finally, part I discusses the so-
cial benefits flowing from joint defense arrangements and concludes
that the benefits outweigh any theoretical ills. Part II traces the his-
torical rise of the joint defense privilege and outlines the privilege's
scope and present construction as an adjunct to the attorney-client
privilege. Part III examines the ethical and constitutional issues that
arise with the present construction of the joint defense privilege when
one member of the joint defense group defects to become a testifying
government witness while other co-defendants proceed to trial. Part
IV reconsiders the privilege as an independent doctrine. This part ar-
ticulates a policy rationale for protecting joint defense communica-
tions, separate and apart from the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine. It also contrasts the joint defense doctrine with the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. In addition,
this part outlines the nature and scope of the duty of confidentiality
that the joint defense requires to achieve its purpose: the promotion
of joint defense arrangements to protect a fair trial. This Article con-
[Vol. 65
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cludes that a separate joint defense doctrine should not deny joint de-
fense members the use of defectors' statements to the group.
I. JOINT DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS
A. Joint Defense Groups at Work
Joint defense groups are arrangements" in which co-defendants
who are represented by separate lawyers agree to cooperate with each
other in formulating their legal position. Co-defendants may agree to
cooperate because they have matters of common legal interest, be-
lieve it is in their mutual interest to coordinate legal strategy, or be-
lieve it may be mutually advantageous to share information and divide
the work of litigation between the various separate lawyers.
The cooperative arrangement can take a variety of shapes. Some-
times the lawyers exchange legal or factual memoranda without shar-
ing client confidences. 12 Sometimes the lawyers meet and disclose,
either orally or via memoranda, their respective clients' confidential
statements.13 Other times, the lawyers and co-defendants find it best
to meet together to discuss joint defense strategy. 4 It also happens
that in pursuit of a joint defense, the lawyer for one co-defendant, or
one of the lawyer's agents-such as a criminal investigator or an ac-
countant-may meet separately or communicate directly with a co-
11. Much, if not all, of the discussion in this Article is applicable to civil proceed-
ings. Joint defense arrangements are beneficial in the civil context as well as the crim-
inal context. Because the criminal context poses constitutional twists not confronted
in civil matters, this Article primarily grapples with the issues in a criminal context.
12. The work product doctrine alone should be sufficient to protect these ex-
changes so long as confidential client communications are not contained therein. See
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 136-38 (Tentative Draft No. 5,
1992).
13. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964)
(grand jury post mortem); Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413, 416-17 (Minn. 1942) (civil
statements), overruled in part by Leer v. Chicago, 308 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Minn. 1981).
14. See, e.g., Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184 (9th Cit. 1965) (involv-
ing husband and wife who were targets of grand jury investigation and whose lawyers
met together to discuss husband's plea strategy); In re Grand Jury, 406 F. Supp. 381,
384-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (describing the defense strategy between targets of the grand
jury investigation and their lawyers); Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.)
822, 835 (1871) (discussing the attendance of two lawyers and all three co-defendants
at a pretrial defense meeting).
Today, many lawyers participating in joint defense groups shy away from meeting
directly with the co-defendants of their clients to avoid the appearance of creating an
attorney-client relationship. See Ethical Implications, supra note 6, at 116-17. Perhaps
the only thing worse than meeting with a co-defendant who is not the lawyer's client is
to meet with him alone. This reluctance to meet with co-defendants directly most
probably springs from fear of disqualification should the witness decide to become a
government witness and require cross-examination at trial. The threat of disqualifica-
tion would be removed by the conceptualization of the privilege protecting joint de-
fense communications posited by this Article. See infra part IV.B. Removing the
threat of disqualification would likely end the distaste for lawyers communicating di-
rectly with the co-defendants of their clients in the joint defense group, which some-
times will be the appropriate and more efficient way of developing a joint defense.
1996]
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defendant who is not his client in the absence of that co-defendant's
lawyer. 15
Although there is cooperation on matters of common interest, joint
defense groups do not behave like a single client unit. The joint de-
fense arrangement is distinguishable from the situation of multiple
representation, where a single attorney represents multiple clients in a
common matter. In the case of a single attorney representing multiple
clients as a single client unit, the clients either do not have conflicts of
interest or they are willing to accept the risks that may flow from com-
mon representation by a lawyer who may develop conflicts of interest.
These risks include disqualification of counsel due to conflicts of inter-
est or representation by counsel with divided loyalties. The clients in
such a situation believe their legal interest is best represented by a
single lawyer. A contractual agreement will exist between each of the
co-defendants and the single lawyer, creating an attorney-client rela-
tionship. Each client looks to the common lawyer as his own lawyer.
This arrangement works best when clients have sufficient unity of in-
terest that one common lawyer can adequaltely protect all.
When multiple clients communicate with the common lawyer repre-
senting them, they speak freely. They act like a single client unit.
They believe and behave as if the information they convey will be
used for their benefit to advance their unified legal position. They act
with knowledge that the information shared amongst themselves will
remain confidential unless they subsequently become adversaries in
court. The clients jointly educate the lawyer on the facts, jointly con-
trol the direction of the legal matter, jointly agree upon a tactical
strategy and, in this way, direct their common lawyer to represent
them in the manner that achieves, in their judgment, their best inter-
est. Little or no thought is given to one client switching sides and
testifying against the others. In the context of common representa-
tion, the scope of a confidentiality duty for communications between
the lawyer and clients is absolute as to the outside world, but there is
no confidentiality between the client members. 6
The case of co-defendants allied in a joint defense group but repre-
sented by separate counsel is fundamentally different. With the joint
defense arrangement, each individual co-defendant enters a contrac-
tual attorney-client relationship with only one lawyer. 7 Each co-de-
15. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1335-36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 833 (1979).
16. Except if the clients stand adverse in a subsequent litigation. See infra note
207.
17. Joint defense arrangements are complicated by the fact that sometimes the
attorneys' fees for all of the co-defendants participating in the joint defense group are
paid by a single co-defendant or someone not named as a co-defendant. For example,
in cases involving criminal investigation of corporate wrongdoing, the corporation
may agree to pay its employee's attorneys' fees in connection with a grand jury inves-
tigation and trial, but only if the employee participates in a joint defense arrangement
876 [Vol. 65
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fendant knows that he is the client of his separately retained lawyer
and that the other co-defendants have their own lawyers. Here the
co-defendants either believe there is a conflict of interest between
them or they refuse to accept the risks that representation by a single
lawyer could entail. They do not share a unity of interest in the out-
come of the case.'" In criminal cases, the guilt of each defendant must
be individually assessed by the jury. The jury considers evidence con-
necting each defendant to the criminal scheme or conspiracy. Unlike
civil cases in which defendants may have obligations of contribution in
the payment of damages if they are jointly liable, in criminal cases,
multiple defendants found liable do not share their punishment: each
serves his own term of imprisonment.
Although co-defendants in joint defense arrangements agree to
share information limited to areas of common interest, their commu-
nications are frequently guarded. Each co-defendant typically "holds
something back" from the others, just in case.19 Even if one co-de-
fendant does not hold back something, he may fear that his co-defend-
ants are being less than completely candid. Co-defendants enter a
joint defense arrangement mistrustful of one another, with the knowl-
edge that one or more of them may at any time decide to withdraw
and become a cooperating government witness and "sell the others
down the river." When co-defendants with separate counsel commu-
nicate in joint defense groups, their conduct and expectations do not
conform to the model of one cohesive attorney-client unit, in which a
single lawyer represents multiple clients.
The client expectations in the two situations are also different. In
the single client unit, each client expects the lawyer to do his best for
him, to be loyal to him, but within the confines of the group's overall
goals. He consents to the conflicts of interest, if any, or is prepared to
with the corporation's lawyers. In narcotics, or other cases, attorneys' fees might be
paid by one co-defendant for all co-defendants, or by someone not charged, as an
expense of the on-going business. "Benefactor payments" of attorneys' fees also oc-
cur in certain group criminal activities, such as crimes involving narcotics distribution
and other conspiracies. United States v. Aiello, 814 F.2d 109, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1987);
United States v. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942, 947-48 & n.1 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 952 (1985). "It is not uncommon in organized crime cases, for example, for a
defense lawyer to represent one defendant while receiving payment from a different
defendant or target." Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly". How the Courts
See Motions To Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 Colum. L Rev. 1201, 1227
n.116 (1989); Laurie P. Cohen, Issue of Lawyer's Loyalty Is Raised by Drexel Em-
ployee's Conviction, Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1989 at B3; see also Gary T. LowenthaL, Joint
Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 Va. L Rev. 939, 960-61
(1978) (noting advantages to both employer and employee when former pays the lat-
ter's lawyer).
18. While it may be a theoretical possibility that criminal defendants could bejointly liable for making restitution to a victim, a right of contribution among criminal
co-defendants seems contrary to public policy and research does not disclose case law
supporting this idea.
19. See FDIC v. Cheng, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97.211 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
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change counsel if conflict ripens and proves unacceptable to him.
Where a single lawyer commonly represents multiple co-defendants,
his ethical obligations run to all clients. The lawyer cannot prefer one
client above the other clients. He must advise the clients of any con-
flict of interest, and the clients must decide whether to put the group's
interests before their own.
In the situation of the joint defense group, however, each client ex-
pects loyalty from his own lawyer, not from a co-defendant's lawyer.
There is no expectation by the participants of a joint defense arrange-
ment that a lawyer will put the good of the group ahead of the good of
his individual client. The clients also do not anticipate a conflict that
would require a change of counsel. Defendants retain separate coun-
sel to prevent conflicts of interest, yet join joint defense arrangements
to provide cohesion to the defense.
A defendant communicating with his own lawyer has received the
benefits contemplated by the attorney-client privilege without the
joint defense doctrine. In the joint defense arrangement, the commu-
nicating defendant speaks with the purpose of advancing the legal in-
terest of the co-defendant. In return, he has only the unsecured
expectation that a co-defendant will reciprocally share information
with him.
A communicating defendant can also hope that through his commu-
nication of information, he has enabled his co-defendants to avoid
raising a defense that is unnecessarily inconsistent with his legal posi-
tion. The co-defendant has no duty to avoid offering an inconsistent
defense, but co-defendants can choose to avoid inconsistent strategies
if they have knowledge of one another's theories and strategies. Co-
defendants in a joint defense arrangement do not behave as a cohesive
client unit, but rather pursue their separate legal interests, which will
sometimes coincide.20 Throughout the defense, each member of the
joint defense group is out for himself and has assumed no obligation
to the contrary.
Co-defendants in a joint defense group are also unlike a nontradi-
tional group client, such as a trade association. Where a trade associa-
tion is the client, for example in an antitrust matter, the lawyer for the
trade association may have direct communication with the constituent
members of the trade association to gather necessary information.
Because the constituent members comprise the trade association, the
fate of the claims against the trade association has a direct impact
upon the continued behavior of the constituent members. It is appro-
priate to extend the attorney-client privilege to govern communica-
tions between the lawyer and the members of the trade association. It
also may be correct to recognize the duties of the attorney-client rela-
20. See id. Cheng offers a stark example of co-defendants pursuing their separate
legal interests despite the agreement to a joint defense effort. Id.
[Vol. 65
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tionship between the lawyer and the constituent members, so as to
preclude the lawyer from representing someone who is an adversary
of the member of the trade association in a substantially related mat-
ter.2' Co-defendants, however, in a joint defense group are less
closely affiliated than members of a trade association. Unlike a trade
association, the legal fate of any co-defendant has no necessary impact
upon any other co-defendant. Thus, the model of the attorney-client
relationship in this context may teach little about the appropriate
scope of confidentiality between co-parties who have entered into a
joint defense arrangement.
B. Hostility to Joint Defense Groups
While it is true that joint defense arrangements may crumble be-
cause they face a pervasive threat from the possible antagonistic posi-
tions of its members, it cannot be ignored that joint defense
arrangements offer substantial benefits to the participants, to the ad-
versary system, and to the public. 2 Despite these benefits, joint de-
fense efforts are frequently viewed with suspicion in some quarters?3
Prosecutors oppose confidentiality for joint defense communications,
because it shields relevant and probative evidence from the fact finder
thereby hindering the determination of criminal responsibility of
those accused of a crime. Prosecutors also fear that joint defense ar-
rangements may include unlawful efforts to impede justice, provide a
group of co-defendants with the opportunity to influence improperly
the memories of witnesses, or otherwise permit a concerted attempt to
obstruct grand jury investigations.24 Others have voiced suspicions
that the confidentiality afforded joint defense groups may allow crimi-
nal conspiracies to continue?25
It is, however, unreasonable and unfair to presume that clients and
lawyers act unlawfully in joint defense arrangements. Furthermore, it
is inappropriate to rely on generalizations about the ethical probity of
defense attorneys.' Indeed, because lawyers and clients witness such
misconduct, lawyers in joint defense groups may be more careful to
avoid impropriety than when defending alone. Nor should we assume
21. 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, 'I 503(b)[06]
(1996).
22. For a discussion of the benefits of joint defense groups, see infra part I.C.
23. The DOJ Alert, Vol. 1, 1991 at 3.
24. Id. "Prosecutors are uneasy because they see in joint defense agreements,
even intentionally, an opportunity to get together and shape testimony." Id.; e.g., Top
Lawyers Are Subpoenaed in BCCI Probe, Am. Law., Apr. 27, 1992, at 72 (prosecutors
suspected that joint defense agreement interfered with the grand jury's receipt of sub-
poenaed documents until assured in writing by defense counsel that they had com-
plied properly with the subpoenas).
25. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 278 (1986) ("[I]t permits coconspir-
ators to continue to conspire at a common defense, now with the privileged assistance
of teams of lawyers.").
26. Green, supra note 17, at 1228.
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that joint defense groups mask continued group criminal activity of
the co-defendants. If we are to believe the government's evidence
from the criminal investigation, it is apparent that the clients did not
need or wait for the protection of confidentiality of a joint defense
agreement to engage in group criminal misconduct. The joint defense
agreement does not significantly enhance the opportunities to engage
in concerted secret criminal activity. To the contrary, having lawyers
injected into the group through joint defense arrangements should sti-
fle further criminal activity except in the rarest instances when the
lawyers participate in criminal activity. There is, however, no reason
to believe this is the norm of the defense bar.
C. The Benefits of Joint Defense Arrangements
Information is the sine qua non of mounting a successful defense.
When there are multiple co-defendants, sharing information is critical
to effective representation.27 Information-sharing occurs naturally
when one lawyer represents multiple clients with similar interests be-
cause the attorney-client privilege protects the confidentiality of their
communications. After Wheat v. United States,28 the norm is separate
representation for criminal co-defendants.
Joint defense groups are essential in criminal cases because of the
dearth of information made available to the co-defendants. The Fifth
Amendment privilege against self incrimination precludes the type of
formal discovery from co-defendants that happens in civil cases as a
matter of right.29 Additionally, the right to discovery from the prose-
cution is limited." Although access to relevant information is essen-
tial for a fair defense, the only means of obtaining such information in
criminal cases is to permit cooperation among the co-defendants and
encourage the voluntary exchange of the information. Given the ab-
sence of formal discovery, the formation of joint defense groups to
promote the voluntary exchange of information is neither surprising
nor suspicious. Without joint defense groups, defendants are deprived
27. See Capra, When Parties Share Interests, supra note 3, at 28 nn.13-15 and ac-
companying text.
28. 486 U.S. 153, 162-63 (1988) (holding that courts may disqualify counsel who
represent multiple co-defendants in a criminal case even where the clients knowingly
and voluntarily waive the right to conflict-free counsel).
29. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Joint defense groups are still appropriate in civil
cases because coordinating of efforts enables each side to present its best case, serving
the adversarial system's goal of fairness.
30. The prosecution's discovery obligations are laid out in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Unless a court otherwise orders, prior statements of government
witnesses are available to the defense after the direct examination of the government
witness. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1994). Furthermore, exculpatory or mitigating evidence
or material evidence otherwise favorable to the defense must also be provided. E.g.,
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
107-14 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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of information, and consequently, denied a meaningful opportunity to
defend themselves by a coordinated defense.
Joint defense groups-as distinct from the situation when one law-
yer represents several co-defendants-are frequently needed in crimi-
nal cases because co-defendants have adverse interests and require
separate counsel. Above all, each defendant "wants... to protect his
own skin, even at the cost of his compatriots' hides being nailed to the
barn door."31 Yet, the co-defendants may well have information they
can share with one another without harming their own interests.32
Separate counsel solves the problems presented by conflicts of interest
but creates vacuums in the knowledge of each defendant. These infor-
mation vacuums can damage the ability of each co-defendant to
mount an effective defense. Joint defense groups, however, allow
each attorney to fill knowledge gaps.
Still another reason in favor of joint defense groups is that when co-
defendants are tried together, it would amount to suicide for them to
offer inconsistent defenses to the fact finder. Coordinated strategy is
important to success. A cacophony of inconsistent defense theories
places co-defendants in a significantly worse credibility position than a
defendant standing trial alone. It is unfair to impose this disability on
multiple co-defendants tried together. To avoid such disparity, co-de-
fendants must be allowed to coordinate their defense if they deem it
beneficial. A joint defense allows co-defendants to weed out weak
and unnecessarily inconsistent defenses and to develop defenses with-
out injuring the legal position of co-defendants. This enables the de-
fense to present its "best" case while serving the goals of the
adversary system.
When properly used, the joint defense arrangement provides bal-
ance to the adversary process. Whether the case is civil or criminal,
the balance necessary to the adversary system does not exist if one
side has a coordinated strategy and access to information while the
other side does not. In criminal cases, more complete information
from co-defendants may disclose the strength of the government's
case and help a defendant make a more informed decision about
whether to plead guilty. In addition, the adversary system benefits as
a whole from information sharing between defendants about weak-
nesses in the government's case, because a defendant's access to
knowledge prevents the government from having unfair plea bargain-
ing leverage.33
31. Michael G. Scheininger & Ray M. Aragon, Joint Defense Agreements, 20 Liti-
gation, Spring 1994, at 11, 13.
32. Id.
33. In a civil action where discovery offers greater access to the facts, joint defense
groups are still beneficial. More complete information may be available through vol-
untary sharing between parties with common interests than discovery would require.
In civil cases, information that otherwise might not be disclosed, might be shared
voluntarily. That information, however, would not be disclosed if the attorney-client
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Our adversary system of justice ideally contemplates a contest be-
tween equals. Each side is expected to put forth its best case. It is
appropriate to pursue this societal goal through the law of evidence.
Unless we allow co-defendants a confidential opportunity to coordi-
nate a unified theory, co-defendants are relegated to offering inconsis-
tent defenses. Such defense behavior helps the prosecution secure
convictions.34 Encouraging co-defendants to communicate about trial
strategy is the only way to assure a contest of equals. These communi-
cations guarantee the defense the ability to make the most effective
use of information through common strategy.
Another benefit of the joint defense privilege is its efficient use of
scarce judicial resources. Information shared in a joint defense ar-
rangement may persuade a defendant to plead guilty and avoid trial.
Trial time may be shortened because duplicative cross-examination is
eliminated. Furthermore, a trial may be streamlined because time
consuming and unnecessarily inconsistent defenses would be weeded
out through the coordinated effort.35
Joint defense efforts also enable co-defendants to share the labor
involved in trial preparation and cross-examination at trial. The re-
search of common legal issues, evidentiary or substantive, can be
shared. Additionally, sometimes the labor entailed in preparing com-
mon motions and writing briefs as well as investigating and developing
factual material can be shared. Lawyers can divide the work and des-
ignate who will be in charge of the cross-examination of particular
privilege fails to protect it from compelled disclosure in the context of formal discov-
ery. Additional evidentiary information in civil actions can work to promote "more
meaningful settlement discussions." Id. More complete information is also helpful in
enabling the parties to determine the relative likelihood of a settlement or a trial. Id.
34. The work product doctrine does allow for some coordination of strategy. It
allows lawyers to share their mental processes and factual investigations with other
non-adversarial lawyers. The work product doctrine, however, does not afford co-
defendants the same opportunities to coordinate their defenses as the joint defense
doctrine. The work product doctrine does not allow lawyers to share information
about their client's communications with co-parties' lawyers. Yet, in cases involving
the joint defense doctrine, there are repeated instances in which the co-defendants'
lawyers found it in the interest of the overall defense to have direct access, in personal
meetings or by exchanging memoranda, with separately represented co-defendants.
Thus, the case law is replete with examples of co-defendants communicating directly
with the lawyers for the other co-defendants in planning overall defense strategy. For
example, in Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871), three sepa-
rately represented co-defendants and two defense lawyers met together. Id. at 839. In
Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965), two grand jury targets and
their separate counsel met together to discuss plea strategy. Id. at 184. In In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), Robert Vesco, other targets of the
grand jury investigation, and their respective counsel met to discuss defense strategy.
Id. at 384-85. The work product doctrine, however, is not broad enough in its protec-
tion to encompass this type of defense coordination of effort.
35. Coordination of efforts between parties sharing common legal or factual inter-
ests is often "not only in their own best interests but serves to expedite the trial or...
the trial preparation." United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1337 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).
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government witnesses.36 This division of labor assists the adversary
system because it promotes better preparation and a more thorough
analysis of the government's case. Both sharing labor and pooling re-
sources reduces the staggering expense of litigation.37
A joint defense arrangement also can be helpful to a corporation
seeking to investigate suspicions of internal corporate wrongdoing.
Without the cooperation and assistance of the employees allegedly in-
volved in the wrongdoing, it is more difficult to investigate possible
misconduct that a corporation would like to eradicate. Employees are
more likely to cooperate in an internal investigation being undertaken
as part of a joint defense effort because their legal interests also will
be protected.38 Thus, the joint defense arrangement can promote the
corporation's interest to abide by the law.
Joint defense arrangements also help procure legal representation
for people who otherwise might lack the financial means to hire a law-
yer. In civil cases and in criminal cases before the right to counsel has
attached,39 many cannot afford the expense of hiring a lawyer. For
example, a corporate employer may be willing only to pay its employ-
ees legal fees in civil or criminal cases if the employees enter into a
joint defense arrangement.' This is also true in criminal cases, some-
one may be willing to defray the cost of legal representation for an-
other if they have appropriately agreed to pursue a joint defense
effort. So long as the lawyer's loyalty runs to his client, rather than to
the person paying the lawyer's fees, there is a net benefit conferred by
this legal representation for someone who otherwise would not be
represented. Joint defense arrangements work to level the playing
36. Division of labor in cross-examination does not mean that only some of the
lawyers cross-examine a witness. Instead, one lawyer may undertake the bulk of the
work in conducting the substantial factual investigation relevant to that witness and
take the lead in developing the most thorough cross-examination designed to discredit
the witness. Multiple co-defendants would benefit from these efforts.
37. The public at large can benefit from the litigation cost savings achieved by
joint defense groups because the defense of indigents accused of crime is funded by
public tax dollars. Joint defense groups achieve this efficiency without compromising
the legal interests of any of the co-defendants.
38. Although a corporation and its employees may share a joint defense effort in
connection with an internal investigation, they do not always do so. An employee's
mistaken belief about the existence of a joint defense arrangement does not give rise
to the confidentiality protection of the joint defense doctrine. United States v. Saw-
yer, 878 F. Supp. 295, 297 n.1 (D. Mass. 1995).
39. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees each person accused of a
crime legal representation at every critical stage of the prosecution. The public will
bear the expense if the defendant is indigent. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
339-45 (1963). The right attaches upon indictment or upon the defendant's first court
appearance. During the grand jury investigation, if the defendant has not made his
first court appearance, he is not entitled to legal counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
Consequently, unless he can afford the expense of a lawyer, he will not have one to
represent his interests during the investigation stage of the proceedings.
40. See Scheininger & Aragon, supra note 31, at 13-14.
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field, serving the search for truth and the interests of justice, as those
goals are realized within the context of an adversary system of justice.
Courts have not elaborated on the substantial benefits that joint de-
fense arrangements bestow on the litigation process Although courts
have not examined the benefits discussed above, courts have recog-
nized other utility in protecting the confidentiality of joint defense
communications.
The joint defense privilege is necessary because "[t]he need to pro-
tect the free flow of information from client to attorney logically exists
whenever multiple clients share a common interest about a legal mat-
ter."'" The joint defense privilege is "meant to recognize 'the advan-
tages of, and even, the necessity for, an exchange or pooling of
information between attorneys representing parties sharing such a
common interest."' 42 Courts have noted that: "[A] cooperative pro-
gram of joint defense is helpful or, a fortiori, necessary to form and
inform the representation of clients whose attorneys are each sepa-
rately retained. ' 43 The joint defense privilege enables counsel for cli-
ents "facing a common litigation opponent to exchange privileged
communications and attorney work product in order to adequately
prepare a defense without waiving either privilege."" The court in In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas45 offered further justification:
Whether an action is ongoing or contemplated, whether the jointly
interested persons are defendants or plaintiffs, and whether the liti-
gation or potential litigation is civil or criminal, the rationale for the
41. Daniel J. Capra, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Common Representations, 20
Trial L.Q., Summer 1989, at 21 (citation omitted) [hereinafter Capra, Common
Representations].
42. Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, 106 F.R.D. 187, 192 (N.D.
IlM. 1985) (quoting Transmirra Prods. Corp. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 572,
579 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)). Defendants with common interests in multiple defendant cases
"are entitled to share information protected by the attorney-client privilege without
danger that the privilege will be waived by disclosure to a third person." Wilson P.
Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977)
("[W]hen information is exchanged between various co-defendants and their attor-
neys that this exchange is not made for the purpose of allowing unlimited publication
and use, but rather, the exchange is made for the limited purpose of assisting in their
common cause."); United States v. Bicostal Corp., No. 92-CR-261, 1992 WL 693384,
at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1992); accord In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) ("The assurance of confidentiality is as important and appropriate where a
cooperative program of joint defense is helpful or necessary to represent clients
whose attorneys are separately retained as it is where co-defendants have engaged
common counsel.").
43. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. 381, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); accord
Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841-42 (1871) (recognizing "a
right, all the accused and their counsel [had] to consult together about the case and
the defence [sic]").
44. Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94 (3d Cir. 1992).
45. 902 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying joint defense privilege to protect docu-
ments shared between parent corporation and its subsidiary both before and after the
subsidiary was separately incorporated).
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joint defense rule remains unchanged: persons who share a com-
mon interest in litigation should be able to communicate with their
respective attorneys and with each other to more effectively prose-
cute or defend their claims.
The social benefits flowing from protecting the confidentiality of joint
defense communications and promoting joint defense arrangements
are confined to the litigation process. The benefits do not advance
social values extrinsic to the litigation.47
The formation of joint defense groups maximizes the strength of the
defendant's case by dividing labor, testing the government's evidence,
and preserving the adversary system of justice. In addition, joint de-
fense groups minimize the waste of judicial time that results from the
representation of uncoordinated defenses in the courtroom by
defendants.
II. Tam RISE OF THE JowNT DEFENSE PRIVILEGE
American protection for communications among co-defendants and
their separately retained lawyers was recognized first in a criminal
case' over one hundred years ago. The case protected the confidenti-
ality of oral communications between co-defendants in the presence
of lawyers.49 It was next invoked in a civil case seventy years later.50
In this case, the doctrine protected a writing reflecting the client's
statements to his own lawyer when that document was shared with the
counsel separately representing co-defendants.5 1 In the 1960s, co-de-
fendants resurrected their requests for the protection of joint defense
communications with two Ninth Circuit criminal decisions.51 These
46. Id at 249; see Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 348-49 (9th
Cir. 1964) (exchanging memoranda made representation of respective clients "more
effective" during the grand jury investigation and any consequent litigation). The ex-
change of information is made "for the limited and restricted purpose to assist in
asserting their common claims." Id. at 350; see also John Morrell & Co. v. Local
Union 304A, United Food & Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 556 (8th Cir. 1990)
(stating that when information is exchanged between co-defendants and their attor-
neys, the exchange is made for the limited purpose of assisting a common cause), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 905 (1991); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1337 (7th Cir.)
(stating that the "the [joint-defense] privilege protects pooling of information for any
defense purpose common to the participating defendants"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833
(1979); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253
(5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (holding that exchange of information is made for limited
purpose of assisting a common cause).
47. This is in contrast to the social benefits extrinsic to the litigation that justify the
privileged status of other protected communications, such as communications be-
tween spouses or between physician and patient.
48. Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841-43 (1871).
49. Chahoon, 62 Va. at 836-44.
50. Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413,417 (Minn. 1942), overruled in part by Leer v.
Chicago, 308 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1981).
51. Schmitt, 2 N.W.2d at 415.
52. Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965) (protecting co-defend-
ants communications at pre-indictment meeting attended by co-defendants and their
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two cases began the modem development of what has since been
called "the joint defense privilege" or "common interest rule. 53 Pro-
tection for the confidentiality of co-defendants' communications when
each co-defendant retains a separate lawyer,54 is relatively young
among privileges when compared with the attorney-client privilege
and the privilege against self-incrimination. One might view this pro-
tection as still in its formative stages. Perhaps because of judicial
resistance to create something new, courts initially treated it as an ex-
tension of the attorney-client privilege.
In Chahoon v. Commonwealth 56 an American court first recognized
the joint defense privilege57 to exclude testimony offered by the de-
fense at a criminal trial in Virginia. In Chahoon, three co-defendants
were charged with conspiracy, each of whom retained his own law-
yer.58 The court tried Chahoon separately from his alleged co-con-
spirators. In its direct case, the government called one of the co-
conspirators to testify as a government witness against Chahoon. 9
The cooperator testified to a conversation between Chahoon and him-
respective lawyers); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 348-49 (9th
Cir. 1964) (protecting communications between prospective co-defendants and their
attorneys during Grand Jury investigation stage of criminal process where they con-
ferred "in confidence in order to apprise each other as to the nature and scope of the
inquiry proceeding before the Grand Jury").
53. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. 381, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding
both Contential Oil and Hunydee instructive). The court noted:
[W]here there is consultation among several clients and their jointly retained
counsel, allied in a common legal cause, it may reasonably be inferred that
resultant disclosures are intended to be insulated from exposure beyond the
confines of the group; that inference, supported by a demonstration that the
disclosures would not have been made but for the sake of securing, advanc-
ing, or supplying legal representation, will give sufficient force to a subse-
quent claim to the privilege.
Id. In SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534
F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976), the privilege exited in communications between executives
of two corporations concerning legal advice where they shared a common interest. Id.
at 513-14. The court noted, however, that:
[A] client's sharing of its attorney's advice with a third party is not in confi-
dence simply because the third party's lawyer thought that there 'might' be a
challenge, which 'could' involve his client. Unless the interests of the parties
are demonstrably common, as when potential defendants discuss grand jury
questioning or intended pleas, the risk of shared exposure must at least be
sufficiently substantial to have prompted the third party's lawyer to counsel
his client regarding the prospective hazard.
Id. at 525 (citations omitted).
54. The privilege is also known as the common interest rule. See Weinstein & Ber-
ger, supra note 21, at § 503(b)[06] (1996).
55. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 389.
56. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
57. See id. at 841-42. Over 100 years ago, two English cases also recognized the
joint defense privilege. See Rochefoucauld v. Boustead, 65 L.J.R. 794, 796 (Ch. 1896);
Enthovern v. Cobb, 42 Eng. Rep. 1019, 1019-20 (Ch. 1852).
58. Chahoon, 62 Va. at 835.
59. Id.
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self in the presence of defense lawyers during a pretrial defense meet-
ing.61 In rebuttal, Chahoon caled the lawyer of the witness to testify
to that same conversation. 6 Chahoon maintained the witness had
inaccurately recounted the conversation in his testimony and sought
to use the lawyer to prove this. Even though the co-defendant had
already testified to this conversation as a government witness, the law-
yer declined to answer and asserted the confidentiality of the lawyer-
client conference.62 The Chahoon court upheld the lawyer's refusal to
testify.63 The court ruled that there should be no distinction between
the confidentiality of statements made at a pretrial defense conference
attended by multiple co-defendants represented by separately re-
tained lawyers and the confidentiality of statements made at a similar
conference where a single lawyer represented multiple clients.' The
court ruled that in the case at bar, the privilege protecting the confi-
dentiality of communications between lawyers and clients extended to
communications between co-defendants in the presence of their law-
yers, for the purpose of facilitating their defense to common charges. 65
The court extended protection to such communications because:
The parties were jointly indicted for a conspiracy to commit a par-
ticular crime, and severally indicted for forging and uttering the
same paper. They might have employed the same counsel, or they
might have employed different counsel as they did. But whether
they did the one thing or the other, the effect is the same, as to their
right of communication to each and all of the counsel, and as to the
privilege of such communication. 66
The Chahoon court reasoned that for purposes of confidentiality,
there was no distinction between the retention of a single lawyer to
represent multiple co-defendants and the retention of separate law-
60. Md at 835-36.
61. Id. at 836.
62. Id. Chahoon, on its facts, seems almost indefensible. The conversation at is-
sue in Chahoon had occurred in the presence of the three alleged co-defendants and
two of their defense lawyers. Id. at 835. A strong argument could have been made
that the objecting party waived the attorney-client privilege when he testified as a
prosecution witness. When Chahoon, who was tried separately from his co-defend-
ants, called the prosecution witness' lawyer to testify about that same conversation,
the court should have disallowed the claim of attorney-client privilege and permitted
the testimony. The government witness had waived the confidentiality of the conver-
sation about which Chahoon sought to elicit testimony. The court required the fur-
ther consent of the third co-defendant who was not on trial. Id. at 840-41. The waiver
of the privilege as to the conversation in question seems obvious because the witness
testified about it and the third co-defendant failed to object. Id. Thus one wonders
whether the protection for joint defense communications may have been born out of
judicial antipathy towards the defense; the protection first arose to stop a defendant
on trial from using information from a joint defense conference in his own defense
when the prosecution used part of the very same conversation against the defendant.
63. Id. at 839-40.
64. Id. at 841.
65. Id
66. Id.
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yers. Both instances were entitled to have the confidentiality of co-
defendants' communications in furtherance of a common defense ef-
fort protected from disclosure without consent. 67 The court further
reasoned that defendants in criminal cases had a right to choose
whether to be represented jointly or separately by counsel.6 8
The Chahoon court's protection of communications in pursuit of a
common defense to common criminal charges69 when defendants re-
tain separate counsel remains sound and is more compelling given to-
day's strong judicial preference that co-defendants in criminal cases
retain separate lawyers.71 Co-defendants, represented jointly or sepa-
rately, need to communicate together and with their lawyers to plan a
common defense strategy. The Chahoon court held that communica-
tions involving separately retained lawyers and their clients allied in a
common legal matter should be protected because the attorney-client
privilege protected the communications when one lawyer represented
several clients.71 Relying on the attorney-client privilege model, the
67. Idt
68. See id Today, co-defendants do not have an unqualified right to retain a sin-
gle lawyer to represent them. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978).
A court can override the choice of multiple co-defendants to be represented by the
same lawyer and demand that each co-defendant retain separate counsel. Wheat v.
United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). In Wheat, the court explained that while the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to select and be represented by the attorney of
one's choice "the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advo-
cate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexora-
bly be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers." Id. at 159. Further, the Court
recognized that multiple representation of criminal defendants presents "special dan-
gers" because of the potential conflict of interest. Id. at 159-60. Hence, the Court
concluded that "where a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can
be no doubt that it may decline a proffer of waiver [of the right of conflict-free coun-
sel], and insist that the defendants be separately represented." Id. at 162.
69. "[lIt was natural and reasonable, if not necessary, that these parties, thus
charged with the same crimes, should meet together in consultation with their coun-
sel, communicate to the latter all that might be deemed proper for them to know, and
to make all necessary arrangements for the defense." Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62
Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 839 (1871).
70. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159-61.
71. Chahoon, 62 Va. at 841. Courts prefer co-defendants in criminal cases to re-
tain separate representation for the prophylactic purpose of avoiding actual conflicts
of interest. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160-62. The Chahoon court implicitly recognized the
needs of co-defendants who retain separate lawyers to confer together in furtherance
of their common defense. Chahoon, 62 Va. at 841. Certainly this need is not de-
creased when multiple co-defendants retain common counsel. The law's preference
for separate representation of co-defendants in criminal cases creates a judicially im-
posed artificial vacuum in the knowledge of the separately retained lawyers. This can
only be cured by allowing unimpeded communications between the separately re-
tained lawyers and the co-defendants when the possible pursuit of a joint defense is in
their mutual interest. Unimpeded communication requires the guarantee of protec-
tion from disclosure to an adversary who would otherwise seek to use the communica-
tions against their makers. Hence, protection in the nature of a confidentiality
doctrine is appropriate.
In order to fill the artificial vacuum of knowledge and encourage communications
in pursuit of a joint defense, it is necessary to provide protection from disclosure to
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Chahoon court reasoned that the consent of all clients was required
before a waiver of confidentiality would be valid.'
The next case to consider whether pursuit of a matter of common
legal interest warranted protecting the confidentiality of communica-
tions between separately retained lawyers was in a civil matter. In
Schmitt v. Emery,7 3 the court held that the confidentiality requirement
of the attorney-client privilege was not lost when the lawyer repre-
senting two co-defendants shared a client interview statement with a
separately retained lawyer representing two other co-defendants.74
The purpose of the exchange was to combine defense efforts to estab-
lish the privileged nature of the document because all of the co-de-
fendants sought to exclude it from evidence at trial and the court had
preliminarily ruled it was admissible.75 The Schmitt court reasoned
that the document did not lose any privileged status when shared with
counsel for co-defendants because it had been disclosed not for the
purpose of publishing its contents-but for the mutual purpose of es-
tablishing the document's inadmissibility.76 The information was
given "in confidence, for the limited and restricted purpose to assist in
asserting their common claims."'  The court ruled that the recipients
of the document acquired a limited right to use the statement to estab-
lish its privileged nature and exclude the statement from the trial
evidence.78
In matters of first impression, the Chahoon and Schmitt courts rec-
ognized the need to protect the confidentiality of client statements
made in the course of a common defense, among separately retained
lawyers for co-defendants in civil and criminal matters. Both courts
relied, in part, on the model of the attorney-client relationship and
applied protection analogous to the attorney-client privilege. These
the adversary and to offer protection so that the information does not harm its giver.
These necessary protections can be achieved by means other than application of the
attorney-client privilege to joint defense communications, even though the Chahoon
court did not choose that path.
This more narrowly-tailored protection is discussed below. See infra part IV. In
other words, the Chahoon court could have reached the same result by recognizing a
separate doctrine to protect the confidentiality of communications when multiple co-
defendants retain separate lawyers but choose to pursue a common defense. The
court's drawing upon the attorney-client privilege may have been an analogy or an
extension of that privilege. The case is unclear as to which route the court took.
72. 62 Va. at 842. The defense could have argued that the third co-defendant's
failure to object to the first testimony about the joint defense communication consti-
tuted a waiver, and no further consent was needed.
73. 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942), overruled in par by Leer v. Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. P. & Pac. Ry., 308 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1981).
74. Id. at 416-17.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 417.
78. Id. The right was limited to the purpose for which it was transmitted by the
information giver. Id.
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decisions are important because they afford protection for confiden-
tial exchanges between co-parties mounting a common defense.79
As the privilege has developed, courts have not looked back to the
soundness of the original doctrinal rationale for the protection. In-
stead, they have forged ahead and consistently reaffirmed the confi-
dential status of communications occurring between joint defense
members and relied on the attorney-client privilege as support for the
protection.80 Courts reason that "[t]he assurance of confidentiality is
as important and appropriate in a joint defense of defendants whose
attorneys are separately retained as it is where co-defendants have
engaged common counsel."'" As the privilege evolved, it came to be
recognized as the "joint defense" or "common interest" exception to
the attorney-client privilege. 82 Ordinarily, a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege results if communications between lawyer and client
are shared with a third party.83 Joint defense communications are an
79. In fact, although the attorney-client privilege was recognized, neither Chahoon
nor Schmitt explicitly declared this type of conference within the attorney-client privi-
lege. They merely recognized the appropriateness of protecting the communication.
Id.; Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 840-41 (1871). At that time in
the development of the protection for communications between co-parties and their
separate counsel, no court would have foreseen the problems that invoking the ration-
ale of the attorney-client privilege would create. In criminal prosecutions, these risks
could include the possibility of attorney disqualification when the prosecution induces
a co-defendant to become a government witness.
In civil cases, co-parties may also settle their claims and switch sides. The liberal
discovery rules in civil cases already made those parties witnesses if their common
adversary sought discovery. A civil settlement could potentially require a party to
disclose greater information-i.e., privileged information-than available through
discovery. Nonetheless, the confidentiality of joint defense communications would
remain intact unless all participants agree to waive. Therefore, a single party "switch-
ing sides" in a civil case is unable to disclose privileged joint defense communications.
Of course, the risk of unauthorized disclosure exists. It is more likely that a lawyer
will "switch sides" and represent a new client wishing to sue a former member of a
joint defense group in which that lawyer once represented another member of the
group. Accord Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 896 F. Supp. 651, 654 (E.D.
Tex. 1995) (involving a defense motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel on the ground
that counsel had formerly represented defendant as a joint defense group member).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989) (pro-
tecting communications made to an accountant aiding attorneys conducting a joint
defense); Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965) (protecting pre-
indictment oral communication between prospective defendants); Continental Oil Co.
v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964) (protecting pre-indictment ex-
changes of memoranda of witness interviews during a Grand Jury investigation be-
tween counsel for co-defendants).
81. State v. Maxwell, 691 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984).
82. E.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (applying joint
defense privilege to civil defendants where liability could arise from separate acts or
omissions and where cross claims might be asserted); Wilson P. Abraham Constr.
Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that an attor-
ney breaches his fiduciary duty if in representation of another client he uses informa-
tion obtained in a joint defense exchange to the detriment of one of the co-
defendants).
83. In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. at 603-04.
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exception because another lawyer or client member of the joint de-
fense group is not treated as a third party for purposes of waiver.'
Generally, courts hold that to establish the joint defense privilege,
the parties must show that the communications were: (1) intended to
be kept confidential; (2) made in pursuit of a joint legal effort; and (3)
intended to advance the common legal interests of the co-parties.s5
The joint defense doctrine requires that co-defendants pursue some
common interest.8 6 Courts recognize that no policy of the attorney-
client privilege is injured by extending protection to confidential com-
munications made in pursuit of a joint defense.87 The joint defense
privilege is thus viewed as an extension of the attorne-client privilege
applied to independently represented co-defendants.'
Courts have interpreted broadly the joint defense privilege. It pro-
tects confidential communications between all co-parties, not just co-
defendants, who share interests in common.89 A mistaken belief that
the parties have agreed to pursue a joint defense does not give rise to
a joint defense privilege.9° Additionally, the presence of a stranger
84. See Capra, When Parties Share Interests, supra note 3, at 1. There is no privi-
lege, however, for communications with another party's lawyer where the interests of
the parties are completely adverse and were not made with any expectations of confi-
dentiality. See Weinstein & Berger, supra note 21, at I 503(b)[06], at 100-01 ("Only if
there is no common interest and the interests of the parties are totally antagonistic
will the privilege be denied."); see also Government of Virgin Is. v. Joseph, 685 F.2d
857, 862 (3d Cir. 1982) (denying privilege for statements made to an attorney whose
client's interests were antagonistic to the declarant); United States v. Cariello, 536
F. Supp. 698, 702 (D.NJ. 1982) (denying privilege in absence of evidence that state-
ment was made in furtherance of a joint defense strategy); People v. Osorio, 549
N.E.2d 1183, 1186-87 (N.Y. 1989) (denying privilege where interests of co-defendants
conflicted).
85. See United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874
F.2d 20,28 (1st Cir. 1989); In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp.,
805 F2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. at 604.
86. The joint defense privilege also should apply to communications made to as-
certain whether a common interest exists, and whether a joint defense is in the best
interests of the individual co-defendants. Invoking the joint defense privilege re-
quires: (1) proof that the communications between co-parties and their individually
retained lawyers were intended to be confidential; (2) concerned matters of commu-
nity interest; and (3) made pursuant to an agreement to facilitate legal representation
in matters of common interest. E.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. at 604.
87. Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. 381, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(stating that the joint defense privilege is consistent with the policy underlying the
attorney-client privilege).
88. United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989).
89. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating joint
defense privilege applies whether "action is ongoing or contemplated, whether the
jointly interested persons are defendants or plaintiffs, and whether the litigation or
potential litigation is civil or criminal"); Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthal-
mology, 106 F.RID. 187, 191-92 (N.D. M. 1985) (recognizing existence of privilege for
plaintiffs' attorneys facing a common litigation adversary in separate antitrust law
suits); cf. Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 441-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (upholding privilege between plaintiff and defendants who shared com-
mon interests).
90. United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 295, 297 n.1 (D. Mass. 1995).
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during joint defense communications will destroy the confidentiality
required by the rule and eliminate its protection.91
Parties need not be aligned on the same side of the litigation for the
joint defense privilege to apply. In one expansive application of the
joint defense privilege, a court protected the confidentiality of com-
munications between adversaries when a plaintiff and one of the de-
fendants were pursuing a matter of common legal interest in the
litigation.92 The privilege applies to both civil and criminal cases.93
The protection can be claimed whether litigation is pending or reason-
ably anticipated.94 The privilege also has been found to extend to
legal advice shared with no litigation in sight.95 The privilege does not
extend, however, to communications among co-defendants in the ab-
sence of their lawyers. 6
The communication may come within the ambit of the joint defense
privilege when a client of one lawyer communicates directly with a co-
defendant's lawyer or a co-defendant's lawyer's agent, such as an in-
vestigator or an accountant assisting the trial preparation.97 Some
courts have opined that the attorney who undertakes to serve his cli-
ent's co-defendants for a limited purpose becomes the co-defendant's
lawyer for that limited purpose. 98 Other decisions seem to eschew the
91. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. 381, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
92. Visual Scene, 508 So. 2d at 443. The court applied the joint defense privilege
to protect the confidentiality of communications between VSI and Metro from disclo-
sure to co-defendants where VSI and Metro were aligned as plaintiff and defendant in
the litigation but had pursued a matter of common legal interest, namely a joint the-
ory of liability regarding another defendant.
93. E.g., Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965) (applying
privilege to communications made where grand jury investigation was pending);
Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 580 F. Supp. 1082, 1098-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (upholding privi-
lege for communications made before the production of a movie where the charge of
libel was anticipated).
94. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 514 (D. Conn. 1976) ("Whether the
legal advice was focused on pending litigation or on developing a patent program that
would afford maximum protection, the privilege should not be denied when the com-
mon interest is clear.").
95. See id Some courts, however, reject the application of the joint defense privi-
lege when there is no actual or potential likelihood of litigation or strong possibility
thereof. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Polycast
Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc. 125 F.R.D. 47, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); cf In re Bevill, Bres-
ler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986) (rejectingjoint defense privilege).
96. United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 535, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no privi-
lege when counsel was absent during co-parties communication).
97. E.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1337 (7th Cir.) (recognizing
privilege for communication made to investigator assisting the lawyer for another co-
defendant), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d
237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989) (extending privilege to confidential communications with an
accountant assisting attorneys in a joint defense effort).
98. E.g., McPartlin, 595 F.2d at 1337.
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creation of an attorney-client relationship arising from joint defense
agreement.99
When one client member of a joint defense group commences coop-
eration with the prosecution, a duty arises to withdraw from the
group.'00 The government is barred from allowing the party who de-
fected from the joint defense group to reveal joint defense communi-
cations revealed to him while part of the joint defense effort.' 0 ' Most
courts hold that the consent of all members is necessary for a valid
waiver to occur.102
III. AN OVERVIEW OF TIE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY CONSTRUING
THE JoINT DEFENSE PRIVILEGE AS PART OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The joint defense privilege has long been conceptualized as an ex-
tension of the attorney-client privilege. The attorney who undertakes
to serve the interests of his client's co-defendants is deemed to be-
come the co-defendants' lawyer for that limited purpose.'0 Conse-
quently, communications among joint defense client members and the
lawyers of co-defendants have been treated as attorney-client commu-
99. See, e.g., Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1247 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that an attor-
ney who represents a co-defendant owes no ethical obligations to the other separately
represented members of the joint defense group concerning the attorney-client rela-
tionship), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1125 (1994); Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
896 F. Supp. 651, 654 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (finding no attorney-client relationship for
purposes of applying the formal rules of ethics).
100. See FDIC v. Cheng, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,211, at 94,896-98 (N.D.
Tex. 1992) (sanctioning a lawyer for failure to notify joint defense group for approxi-
mately two years of her client's cooperation with the government).
101. The co-defendants proceeding to trial whose joint defense communications are
revealed to the prosecution by a defecting member would suffer injury to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. See United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1117 (2d
Cir. 1995) (finding insufficient evidence of prejudice when cooperator attended a joint
defense meeting after negotiations to become a cooperators witness began because
government built a "chinese wall" to avoid learning the defense strategy discussed at
that meeting).
102. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 1990); see Capra,
When Parties Share Interests, supra note 3, at 28. But see Western Fuel Ass'n v. Bur-
lington N. R.R., 102 F.R.D. 201,203 (D. Wyo. 1984) (finding that a party participating
in joint defense communications may waive the privilege with respect to its own com-
munications to the joint defense group).
103. See supra text accompanying note 98. The attorney-client privilege provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client un-
less the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation" Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6 (1995) [hereinafter Model Rules].
The attorney-client privilege has been extended to include the joint defense privi-
lege. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text; see also Weinstein & Berger,
supra note 21, 503(b)[06] (stating that attorney client privilege exists in cases where
joint clients share a common interest); Waller v. Financial Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 579,
583 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987).
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nications and cloaked with the virtually impenetrable protection af-
forded attorney-client communications."°
The situation arises with foreseeable frequency in criminal cases
that a member of the joint defense group changes sides to become a
prosecution witness.' 5 The government completely controls this
event because of its power to induce voluntary cooperation by immu-
nizing a defendant or tendering a favorable plea bargain. The prose-
cutor controls the timing of this defection, which might occur as early
as the grand jury investigation stage or as late as the eve of trial or
even during trial.' 0 6 Given the present construction of the joint de-
fense privilege, aggressive prosecutors have an added incentive to
convert one of the members of the joint defense group into a govern-
ment witness and to do it as late as possible. By transforming a mem-
ber of the joint defense group into a prosecution witness, the
Government gains much more than its legitimate right to this witness'
evidence. The government now has a powerful tactical advantage
over the defense because it holds a tool to urge the disqualification of
the lawyers representing the co-defendants proceeding to trial.
If the defector's statements to the joint defense groups are attorney-
client communications, whenever the prosecution transmogrifies a
joint defense group member into a testifying government witness, the
lawyers defending the remaining co-defendants face an ethical di-
lemma. If they must cross-examine that government witness at the
trial, the attorney-client privilege and rules of professional conduct
seem to bar the attorney from using the defector's confidential attor-
ney-client communications in cross-examination.0 7 The lawyer, how-
ever, owes his client standing trial a duty of loyalty, encompassing a
duty of rigorous cross-examination of witnesses testifying against the
client. If the lawyer cannot cross-examine the turncoat with informa-
tion the lawyer has received, an actual conflict of interest arises be-
tween the duty of confidentiality owed the witness and the duty of
undivided loyalty owed the client standing trial. This actual conflict of
interest implicates the defendant's constitutional guarantee to effec-
tive assistance of counsel. To avoid this impairment of the defense, at
the urging of prosecutors, courts have considered disqualifying the
104. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. 381, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822 (1871).
105. For a discussion of this problem, see Ethical Implications, supra note 6, at 115.
106. During the middle the World Trade Center bombing case trial in the summer
of 1995, the government induced one of the co-defendants who was a party to the
joint defense group to switch sides to become a government witness. Bomb Trial De-
fense Faults Judge on Plea, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1995, at A8.
107. See Ethical Implications, supra note 6, at 123. Canon 4 of the Model Code
requires a client's communications be confidentially maintained. Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility Canon 4 (1979) [hereinafter Model Code].
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lawyer from continuing to represent the client who is proceeding to
trial.'08
A. Ethical Issues Posed by the Present Construction
Several times courts have confronted instances where a lawyer rep-
resenting one member of a joint defense arrangement at trial must
cross-examine a member who withdrew from the joint defense group
to become a cooperating government witness.'0 9 These courts have
assumed that grounds to disqualify trial counsel exist when this event
occurs.
In United States v. Anderson,"0 Anderson and other employees
were charged, inter alia, with criminal violations of conspiracy and
mail fraud laws. The various co-defendants retained separate lawyers
to represent them. They entered into a joint defense arrangement
that required all information exchanged to be confidential within the
joint defense group."' Some members of the joint defense group
eventually withdrew and were expected to testify as government wit-
nesses at Anderson's trial."' The prosecutor moved to disqualify An-
derson's lawyer on the ground that the lawyer had a conflict of
interest arising from his inability to cross-examine the defectors with
the information obtained from them in the course of the joint defense
arrangement."13 The prosecutor argued that the lawyer's duty of con-
fidentiality owed to the defecting witness conflicted with the duty of
loyalty owed his client at trial.
The Anderson court held a disqualification hearing and concluded
that Anderson's lawyer did not have a conflict of interest because he
possessed little if any confidential communications from the defectors
who would be adverse trial witnessess." 4 The Anderson court found
that Anderson could waive any potential conflicts "based on the fact
that his counsel may not use or seek to elicit from witnesses informa-
tion obtained solely under the joint defense doctrine."' 5
In United States v. McDade,"6 defendant, Congressman McDade,
and his lawyer entered into a joint defense agreement with Mr. Wittig,
another codefendant, and his lawyer. The joint defense arrangement
108. United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *6-9
(E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992); United States v. Anderson, 790 F. Supp. 231, 232 (W.D.
Wash. 1992).
109. See United States v. Bicostal Corp., No. 92-CR-261, 1992 WVL 693384, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1992); McDade, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *2-3; Anderson,
790 F. Supp. at 231-32.
110. 790 F. Supp. 231, 232 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
111. Id. at 231.
112. Id. at 231-32.
113. Id
114. Id. at 233.
115. Id.
116. No. 92-249, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992).
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lasted two years, during that time, Wittig shared information with Mc-
Dade's lawyer regarding the grand jury investigation." 7 Wittig
neither sought not received advice from McDade's lawyer regarding
the grand jury investigation." 8 The McDade court found that the
joint defense communications were privileged and that McDade's law-
yer owed Wittig a duty of confidentiality.1"9 Wittig was indicted, pled
guilty and agreed to cooperate against McDade.120 The prosecutors
moved to disqualify McDade's lawyer because of divided loyalties be-
tween the duty of confidentiality owed to Wittig and the duty of vigor-
ous representation owed to McDade. 2' The defector, Wittig, did not
join in the motion.'22
Although finding McDade's representation "short of being conflict-
free,"'12 3 the McDade court denied the motion to disqualify for several
reasons. First, recognizing the Sixth Amendment' 2 concerns that Mc-
Dade be afforded "full, constitutional, due process representation,"
the court ruled that it would "appear something of a perverse paradox
. ..to drive a cold chisel in between client and counsel under the
constitutional rubric of affording him effective counsel."' 25 The court
acknowledged that McDade's defense lawyer was capable and very
conversant with the facts of the particular case.126 The court also
stressed the great confidence McDade had in his lawyers and Mc-
Dade's opinion that to lose his long-standing lawyer would cause him
to suffer a "diminution in the quality of his representation."' 27
The court further reasoned that in allowing McDade to waive his
right to cross-examine Wittig based on confidential joint defense com-
munications, the defense "in effect, forgoes nothing" because no law-
yer could cross-examine Wittig based on his privileged
communications. 28 Therefore, the court did not find that the agree-
117. IL at *3. This case is complicated by the fact that before the joint defense
arrangement, McDade's lawyers also represented Wittig. But the court found that
their "actual representation" of Wittig, as distinct from the joint defense agreement
was "limited in duration and scope." Id. at *5 n.1.
118. Id at *3.
119. Id. at *5 n.1.
120. Id. at *3.
121. Idt at *6.
122. Id. at *5.
123. Idt at *13.
124. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[ijn all criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
Const. amend. VI. A critical aspect of preparing a defense to a criminal case is select-
ing the person who, as the defendant's lawyer, will serve as the defendant's assistant
and representative. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 166 (1988) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
125. McDade, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *6-7.
126. Id. at *7.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *8.
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ment not to cross-examine erected "any great barrier.., to the full,
robust quest for truth that a tribunal of justice requires."1 29
The third reason the court refused to disqualify McDade's lawyer
was because Wittig, the witness, did not join in the government's dis-
qualification motion.130 The witness demanded only that his commu-
nications be kept confidential.' 3' McDade agreed to this demand.
For those reasons, the conflict of interest the McDade court believed
arose did not require that McDade's lawyer be disqualified." 2
To the extent communications are shared on matters of community
interest, the lawyer for one party is deemed the lawyer for other par-
ties who have communicated statements to such attorney for the lim-
ited purpose of pooling information. 33 Conceived in this fashion, the
ethical rules'3 governing an attorney with multiple concurrent clients
in a single proceeding inherently attach. These rules impose duties
running not only to the client who retained the lawyer but to all mem-
bers of the joint defense group who have made confidential state-
ments to a lawyer for a co-defendant. 35
129. Id. at *8-9.
130. Id. at *9.
131. Id.
132. Id- at *12. In another case involving a joint defense arrangement the court
also thought that the need to cross examine a defector from the joint defense group
might create a potential conflict of interest that was "very attenuated." United States
v. Bicostal Corp., No. 92-CR-261, 1992 WL 693384, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1992).
In Bicostal, the court refused to allow discovery into the joint defense agreement on
grounds that it may intrude on the privileged relationship. Id.
133. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 833 (1979); Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987); see Capra, Common Representations, supra note 41, at 25.
134. See Model Rules, supra note 103, Rules 1.6, 1.7, 1.9(a); see infra note 136-38
and accompanying text.
135. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250,253 (5th
Cir. 1977); see United States v. Anderson, 790 F. Supp. 231, 232-33 (W.D. Wash.
1992).
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These ethical duties of loyalty136 and confidentiality137 continue af-
ter the professional relationship has ended.' 38 Because each lawyer
seemingly owes these duties to each of the multiple co-parties of the
original client, as the protection for joint defense communications is
now construed, ethical conflict may arise if the lawyer must cross-ex-
amine a government witness who was a former member of the joint
defense group.' 39 Ethical questions are implicated if one co-defend-
ant on trial wishes to cross-examine a government witness using the
joint defense communication of another co-defendant.140  Ethical
questions can also arise when a lawyer in a subsequent proceeding
represents a client with interests adverse to a former member of a
joint defense group, who made confidential statements to the law-
136. Model Rules 1.7 and 1.9 define the lawyer's duty of loyalty. See Model Rules,
supra note 103, Rules 1.7, 1.9. Rule 1.9(a) of the Model Rules provides that:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation.
I- Rule 1.9(a).
Rule 1.9 (c) provides:
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose
present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require
with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally
known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6
or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.
Ild. Rule 1.9(c).
137. Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules provides that:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a cli-
ent unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except
as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;
or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a crim-
inal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any pro-
ceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
138. Id Rule 1.6. In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985); United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *34 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 1992).
139. McDade, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *6-8; United States v. Anderson,
790 F. Supp. 231, 232-33 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
140. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1335-36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 833 (1979).
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yer,14 1 at least if the two proceedings are substantially related. 4 ' The
presence at a joint defense group meeting of a lawyer or client when
cooperation negotiations with the government have begun also raises
ethical dilemmas. 43
Courts addressing these questions have assumed that the confiden-
tiality of the joint defense privilege operates to preclude lawyers from
using joint defense communications to cross-examine.'4 This con-
struction of the privilege imposes limits on the lawyer's cross-exami-
nation to avoid disclosure of the communications given in pursuit of
joint defense efforts. 45 Courts have also assumed that disqualifica-
tion of a lawyer may be appropriate or necessary to protect the confi-
dentiality of statements made in the course of a joint defense
arrangement. 46 Thus, the ethical issues arising when one member of
the joint defense group resigns to become a government cooperator
threaten to disqualify lawyers for those defendants proceeding to trial.
Even when no joint defense group member cooperates with the gov-
141. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250,253 (5th
Cir. 1977). But see Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 896 F. Supp. 651,654 (E.D.
Tex. 1995) (refusing to disqualify counsel in a civil action and rejecting claim that a
member of a joint defense group is a client for purposes of Rule 1.9 of Texas Discipli-
nary Rules of Professional Conduct).
142. In Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th
Cir. 1977), a civil matter, the court disqualified a lawyer who represented a party with
interests adverse to another party who in a prior litigation had been in a joint defense
arrangement with the lawyer's present client. Id. at 252-53. The court applied the
substantial relationship test. Id. Nonetheless, it is not certain that federal courts will
apply the substantial relationship test in criminal cases to disqualify lawyers from rep-
resenting clients where a government witness formerly was a co-defendant and be-
longed to the joint defense group.
For example, in United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1975),
the court refused to apply civil disqualification standards in a criminal case because of
the competing Sixth Amendment right to counsel Id. at 592-93. The court instead
balanced the witness' interest in confidentiality against the need for the lawyer to
continue in the representation. ld.
143. United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1117 (2d Cir. 1995) (refusing to recog-
nize a Sixth Amendment violation when prosecutors had begun cooperation negotia-
tions with a member of the joint defense group who attended a further joint defense
meeting, and holding that it was the burden of the defendant to allege "specific facts"
of "communication... to the prosecutor and prejudice"); see FDIC v. Cheng, 1992
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,211, at 94,896-98 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
144. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir.) (holding that co-
defendant could not use joint defense communications of another to cross-examine a
government witness), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. McDade, No.
92-249, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992); United States v.
Anderson, 790 F. Supp. 231, 232 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (discussing client's ability to
waive right to council free of undivided interests).
145. See McPartlin, 595 F.2d at 1336-37; McDade, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at
*8.
146. Wilson P. Abraham, 559 F.2d at 253 (remanding issue of disqualifying lawyer
in civil case); see McDade, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *11 (refusing to disqualify
lawyer where witness did not seek disqualification, and only the prosecutor did); An-
derson, 790 F. Supp. at 232 (refusing to disqualify lawyer where the amount of confi-
dential information shared was slight).
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ernment, one co-defendant, in his defense, may wish to offer at trial a
statement made by another member of the joint defense group who
refuses to consent to its disclosure.'47 An ethical issue is again raised
as to the scope of a lawyer's duty of confidentiality owed the maker of
the confidential statement.
Some courts have asserted that a joint defense arrangement creates
legal and ethical duties like any other attorney-client relationship run-
ning from the lawyer of co-defendant A to co-defendants B and C
who participate in the joint defense arrangement. 48 Other courts,
however, dispute this and recognize that a joint defense arrangement
itself creates no ethical duties whatsoever to any client member of the
group except the lawyer's immediate client. These courts further con-
clude that no other co-defendant becomes the client of a lawyer just
because they share a joint defense arrangement.149 In that instance,
when a member of the joint defense group becomes a government
witness, the lawyers would be free from any conflict of interest in the
representation of his client and no ground for disqualification exists.
If courts seek guidance from the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 5 ° an inspection of the language of the
rules demonstrates why the rules do not apply to the situation of a
joint defense arrangement. Rules 1.7 and 1.9 define the lawyer's duty
of loyalty. Rule 1.7 (a) bars a lawyer from simultaneously represent-
ing two clients whose interests are directly adverse.' 5 1 This rule
should be inapplicable. A member of a joint defense group should not
by virtue of that status alone become the client of his co-defendant's
separate lawyer. 152 Those courts that have rhetorically declared a law-
147. McPartlin, 595 F.2d at 1336-37 (disallowing use of joint defense communica-
tion to cross-examine government cooperator where the maker of the statement did
not consent).
148. E.g., id. at 1336-37; Wilson P. Abraham, 559 F.2d at 253; McDade, 1992 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 11447 at *11; Anderson, 790 F. Supp. at 232-33. Others, however, have
recognized that a lawyer's participation in a joint defense arrangement should not
automatically create ethical duties or legal responsibilities owing to the co-defendants
of his client. See Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1247 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1125 (1994); Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 896 F. Supp. 651, 653 n.6 (E.D.
Tex. 1995) ("[M]embers of the Joint Defense Group... are not clients" for purposes
of Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.06(c)); Matthew D. Forsgren,
Note, The Outer Edge of the Envelope: Disqualification of White Collar Criminal De-
fense Attorneys Under the Joint Defense Doctrine, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 1219, 1242-43
(1994) ("[J]oint defense attorneys do not owe their absolute fidelity to joint defense
members other than their own clients ... ." (footnote omitted)).
149. Brown, 2 F.3d at 1246-47; Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 653.
150. Model Rules, supra note 103.
151. Id Rule 1.7(a).
152. Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 653 n.6. In that civil case, the court ruled that members
of the joint defense group were not a client for Texas Disciplinary Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 1.6(c) purposes, so their consent was not necessary under the rule.
Id. at 654; accord Brown, 2 F.3d at 1247 (stating attorney was "free of any legal or
ethical obligation to any defendant" other than her client). But see United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1337 (7th Cir.) ("The attorney who thus undertakes to serve
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yer in a joint defense arrangement to be the lawyer for all co-defend-
ants153 have engaged more in hyperbole than in thoughtful analysis of
the consequences that follow if that were really to be the case. The
Second Circuit employed a more restrained approach in Brown v.
Doe." In Brown, the court recognized that in a joint defense ar-
rangement, no ethical duty of loyalty runs from a lawyer representing
one co-defendant to the group, to other co-defendants, or to any one
other than the lawyer's client. This approach reflects a greater sensi-
tivity to the actual dynamics of the joint defense arrangement. 15
Under Brown's reasoning, each lawyer in a joint defense arrangement
has only one client to represent. The attorney owes all ethical duties
to that single client.
Model Rule 1.7(b) bars an attorney from representing a client when
obligations to another client or third person would be materially lim-
ited by the challenged representation. 156 Model Rule 1.7(b) should
again be inapplicable because, a member of the joint defense group is
not the client and never was a client of the lawyer for his co-defend-
ant. He is, of course, a third person, but whether obligations to him
would be materially limited by the lawyer's continued representation
of his client depends on how courts define the lawyer's duty of confi-
dentiality respecting a joint defense communication. 15 Whatever the
scope of the lawyer's obligation to the defecting member of the joint
defense group, it does not independently arise from the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. The scope of the duty of confidentiality should
arise from the scope of the joint defense privilege rather than from an
imputed attorney-client relationship. The rule of construction gov-
erning communications given pursuant to a joint defense arrangement
proposed by this Article does not contemplate absolute confidential-
ity. 5 Under the construction proposed by this Article, the obligation
of confidentiality owed to the government witness would not stop the
lawyer from using the information in furtherance of the representa-
tion of his client. Model Rule 1.7(b) itself would pose no additional
ethical obstacle.
Rule 1.9(a) forbids a lawyer from representing someone in the same
or a substantially related suit whose interests are materially adverse to
a former client.159 Again, the joint defense member turned govern-
his client's co-defendant for a limited purpose becomes the co-defendant's attorney
for that purpose."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).
153. McPartlin, 595 F.2d at 1337.
154. 2 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir. 1993).
155. Id. at 1247.
156. Model Rules, supra note 103, Rule 1.7(b).
157. See infra part IV (suggesting that courts redefine the extent of confidentiality
afforded communications given pursuant to a joint defense arrangement).
158. See infra part IV.
159. Model Rules, supra note 103, Rule 1.9(a).
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ment witness is not a former client.160 In addition, it cannot be said
that a government witness has interests materially adverse to the in-
terests of the client who is on trial. The government witness has no
interest at stake in the trial of his former co-defendant; he is not liter-
ally in an adverse position 161 vis a vis the defendant on trial, despite
the fact that his truthful testimony may be damning to the legal posi-
tion of the defendant on trial.
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rule dictates the lawyer's duty of confidenti-
ality.'62 It forbids, except in limited circumstances, a lawyer to dis-
close information relating to the representation of a client without the
client's consent.163 Again, the former joint defense member turned
government witness never was a client.' 64 Any duty of confidentiality
owed to him is not the product of Rule 1.6, but derives from the scope
of protection to be given to communications in pursuit of a joint de-
fense. The breadth of confidentiality owed is the present question.
This Article demonstrates that cross-examination of the government
witness should not exclude the statements made by the witness to the
joint defense group. 65
160. Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 896 F. Supp. 651, 653 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
(holding that joint defense group member is not a client for purposes of Texas Disci-
plinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.06); see Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1247 (2d
Cir. 1993) (holding that lawyer of one co-defendant owes the other co-defendants,
members of joint defense groups, no ethical duties).
161. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. 381, 393-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Even if a member of a joint defense group has potential claims against another mem-
ber, they will not be adversaries until a lawsuit is commenced. The fact that one
member of the joint defense group becomes a govermnent witness does not make him
an adversary of the defendant on trial. Id. The court in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
held that ICC's potential claims against Vesco, in existence at the time of their joint
defense meeting, and ICC's filing of a lawsuit against Vesco did not make ICC and
Vesco adversaries in the criminal case. There was not "justification for requiring the
disclosure of a former co-defendant's confidences for use in a third party proceeding."
Id. at 394; accord State v. Archuleta, 217 P. 619, 621 (N.M. 1923). Archuleta involved
an attempt to impeach a government witness who testified against several defendants
in a peijury trial. On a previous occasion, the witness and the defendants jointly suc-
ceeded in defending against a murder charge. The defendants were then indicted for
committing perjury at the murder trial. Id. At the peijury trial, the co-defendants
tried to impeach the government witness with statements he made to his lawyer and
co-defendants during the prior joint defense effort. Id. at 620-21. The court rejected
the use of the witness's statement because the attorney-client privilege remained in-
tact unless the parties became adversaries: "The witness under cross-examination...
is in no sense a party to the proceeding .... Of course, in a broad sense, a contro-
versy had arisen between the witness and the appellants as to the truth in regard to
the murder with which all were jointly charged." Id. at 621. Here, the interest of the
parties to the privilege was not adverse even though the witness testified against his
former co-defendants.
162. Model Rules, supra note 133, Rule 1.6.
163. Id-
164. See Brown, 2 F.3d at 1247; Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 653.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 139-47.
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The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility ("ABA Ethics Committee"), c'6 has ren-
dered an opinion in another context concerning the ethical obligations
of an attorney who has represented a client who participated in a joint
defense arrangement in a civil proceeding. The following hypotheti-
cal167 was posed. After Lawyer left the firm where she represented
one member of a joint defense group, Lawyer was approached and
asked by a new client to represent him and file civil suit against the
members of the joint defense consortium who were not Lawyer's cli-
ent.16s The questions asked of the ABA Ethics Committee included:
(a) what are Lawyer's obligations to her prior client who had been a
member of the joint defense group? and (b) what are Lawyer's obliga-
tions to the other members of the joint defense group? 16 9
The ABA Ethics Committee analyzed the questions separately. In
analyzing Lawyer's obligations to her former client, the ABA Ethics
Committee looked toward Rule 1.6 and Rule 1.9170 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.6(a) provides that: "A lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to their representation of a client
consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are implicitly
authorized in order to carry out the representation."' 7 t The ABA
Ethics Committee ruled that paragraph (a) of Rule 1.6 was potentially
applicable because the joint defense group may have shared work
product that would enjoy qualified immunity from discovery.172 It
also may have shared "attorney-client confidences" within the "allied
lawyer" doctrine of In re LTV Securities Litigation, under which such
confidences can be shared with counsel for another party without loss
of the attorney-client privilege. 1 3 In the ABA Ethics Committee's
opinion shared information of both kinds would count as "information
relating to the representation of a client" under Rule 1.6(a), even if it
came from a member of the joint defense group other than the client
of Lawyer. 74 Lawyer would be prohibited from disclosing that infor-
mation except with the consent of her former client.
It follows that a lawyer's obligations to his client are not violated
under Rule 1.6(a) when a lawyer uses the communications of a
defector whether those communications are embraced under the work
product doctrine or the doctrine permitting allied lawyers to share cli-
166. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 395
(1995) [hereinafter Formal Op. 395].
167. 1d at 1.
168. Id at 1-2.
169. Id at 2.
170. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
171. Model Rules, supra note 103, Rule 3.
172. Formal Op. 395, supra note 166, at 2.
173. Id. at 2-3 (citing In re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (NJ). Tex.
1981)).
174. Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
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ent confidences, to cross-examine the defector so long as a lawyer's
client consents. If a bar exists, it arises elsewhere.
Rule 1.9(a) and (c) 175 offer protection for a former client. The
ABA Standing Ethics Committee treated only a lawyer's contractual
client, not the other members of the joint defense group, as a "client"
for purposes of the protection of the rule.176 This construction of the
"client's" identity renders Rule 1.9 irrelevant to a former member of
the joint defense group. The defector was never a client and therefore
cannot be considered a former client. Further, it cannot be said that
the defector and the client have materially adverse interests when the
defector has no stake in the outcome of the proceedings against the
lawyer's client. The defector is merely a prosecution witness and not a
person with interests adverse to the client of lawyer.
Rule 1.9(c) prohibits a lawyer who has formerly represented a client
from using information related to the representation to the disadvan-
tage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 allows.' 7 The ABA Eth-
ics Committee assumed that only the client's consent was required
because the other members of the joint defense group were not con-
strued as "clients" for purposes of Rule 1.9(c). 178 Applying Rule
1.9(c) to the situation of the cross-examination of a defector from the
joint defense group, again it seems that client's consent is sufficient to
allow the lawyer to cross-examine the defector with joint defense
communications without the lawyer running afoul of the prohibitions
of Rule 1.9(c).
The ABA Ethics Committee found that in its hypothetical, as a
practical matter, it was likely that the joint defense members agreed to
keep their exchanged information confidential. 79 The lawyer would
then owe his client a duty to honor that agreement but the client could
release the lawyer from the obligation.8 0 The question then is the
extent of the lawyer's obligations to the other members of the joint
defense group who were not his clients but from whom he received
confidential information. The ABA Ethics Committee ruled that a
lawyer does not have any ethical responsibilities pursuant to Rules 1.6
or 1.9 to other members of the joint defense group from whom he
received confidential information.'' Rather, the ABA Ethics Com-
175. Model Rules, supra note 103, Rule 1.9(a), (c).
176. See Formal Op. 395, supra note 166, at 3-4.
177. Model Rules, supra note 103, Rule 1.9. The crime-fraud and the lawyer-client
dispute exceptions as discussed in Model Rules, supra note 103, Rule 1.6(b)
178. Formal Op. 395, supra note 166, at 4.
179. Il at 3.
180. If the client contractually agreed with the other members of the joint defense
group to preserve the confidentiality of the exchanged information, and the client
thereafter consented to lawyer's use of the information, the ABA opinion ruled that
the lawyer would be freed of the ethical obligation of Rule 1.6(a) although the client
would be exposing itself to liability for breach of the confidentiality agreement. Id. at
3.
181. Id at 4-5.
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mittee thought any duty of confidentiality that a lawyer owed to the
other members of the joint defense group arose from case law, opin-
ing that the lawyer would "almost surely" have a fiduciary obligation
to the other members that might lead to his disqualification.'82
In the facts posed in the hypothetical before the ABA Ethics Com-
mittee and again in Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel
Corp., s the confidences of the other members of the joint defense
group were about to be used to their detriment. s4 One could under-
stand why fiduciary duty would prevent a lawyer from exploiting the
communications of those who are not his client to the detriment of the
makers of the communications. The policy encouraging the formation
of joint defense groups would be undermined if the communications
of members of the joint defense group could later be used to harm the
makers of the communications.
This situation is distinguishable from the case of a lawyer using a
defector's joint defense communications to cross-examine him when
he testifies as a nonparty witness for the prosecution against his for-
mer co-defendants in a criminal action. The defector's confidential
communications are not being used to his detriment because he has
nothing at stake. The defector is not an adverse party, in the criminal
action in which the co-defendants are on trial. Moreover, the defector
made the communications for the express purpose of providing his co-
defendants with information to defend themselves. The information is
used for the very purpose the communication was made. In addition,
using communications made to the joint defense group to cross-ex-
amine the defector advances the policies underlying the joint defense
doctrine. The doctrine was designed in part to encourage co-parties to
gather useful information from those most likely to possess material
information and from whom formal discovery is otherwise
unavailable.
The import of the ABA Ethics Committee's ruling is that (1) the
use of information received by Lawyer from Client's co-defendants is
not barred by ethics rules when the client consents and (2) for pur-
poses of the applicability of the rules of ethics, merely joining a joint
defense group does not convert the client's co-defendants into clients.
The extent of a lawyer's obligations owed to the other members of the
joint defense group, if any, arise from other doctrinal sources, such as
fiduciary duty law or perhaps contract law. The scope of the confiden-
tiality to be attached to joint defense communications under the joint
182. I. at 5 (applying a fiduciary duty running towards the non-client members of
a joint defense group, and holding that a lawyer should be disqualified in a civil suit
from bringing an action against a former civil co-defendant of his client, when there is
a substantial relationship between the subject matters of the two representations and
confidential information was shared in the prior representation) (citing Wilson P.
Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977)).
183. 559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977).
184. William P. Abraham, 559 F.2d at 253; Formal Op. 395, supra note 166, at 3.
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defense doctrine is a fresh question of evidence law, not professional
responsibility law.' 85 The rules of professional ethics as they are now
written do not apply to prevent the cross-examination of a defector to
the joint defense group. Ethical obligations that are imposed, by way
of fiduciary duty law or under evidence law, should strive to give max-
imum effect to the policies underlying the joint defense doctrine. The
should not impede them by mistakenly attaching ethical obligations
that risk a lawyer's disqualification in representing his client.
B. The Constitutional and Fairness Issues
The joint defense "privilege" is recognized to preserve Sixth
Amendment guarantees and to aid the right to counsel in presenting a
defense. It is particularly anomalous to construe it in a way that
defeats Sixth Amendment guarantees, such as the right to confronta-
tion and counsel of choice. Consider a simple illustration of this prob-
lem. Suppose a grand jury suspects that a corporation has
overcharged the Department of Defense for defense contract work.
The several corporate officers and the corporation may all be
targets186 of the grand jury investigation. The suspected individual
and corporate wrongdoers could hire one lawyer to represent every-
one during the investigation.187 This would be efficient given the
overlapping facts. To avoid the conflicts of interest inherent in one
lawyer representing multiple clients,'81 each corporate officer and the
corporation itself could retain separate counsel. Despite being repre-
185. For a discussion of this and the lawyer's fiduciary duty to the joint defense
group, see infra part IV.
186. A "target" is someone about whom the grand jury has sufficient information
to find that probable cause exists to believe the person has engaged in criminal mis-
conduct. See U.S. Dep't of Justice Manual, § 9-11.150 (1996). A subject is someone
whom the grand jury is investigating because of allegations of criminal misconduct,
but about whom the grand jury has not gathered sufficient information to find prob-
able cause to indict. Id. If sufficient evidence is found, a subject then becomes a
target. Id. Grand jury targets and subjects are distinguished from a third category of
persons, those who are mere witnesses. Id.
187. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 1200.28 (1996). This section, a
codification of DR5-109, states:
When a lawyer employed or retained by an organization is dealing with the
organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or
other constituents, and it appears that the organization's interests may differ
from those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing, the lawyer
shall explain that the lawyer is the lawyer for the organization and not for
any of the constituents.
Id. This warning is designed to inform individuals that they are not being jointly rep-
resented by the corporation's attorney as soon as it appears the individual's interests
may be different from those of the corporation.
188. Model Code, supra note 107, DR 5-105; Green, supra note 17, at 1203; see also
Gary T. Lowenthal, Successive Representation by Criminal Lawyers, 93 Yale L.J. 1
(1983) (discussing conflicts inherent in representing a client in a criminal case in which
a previous client is involved); see infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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sented by separate lawyers, the co-defendants' 89 may recognize the
benefits of a coordinated defense in which they can pool information
about factual and legal issues in which they share a common interest.
The separately retained lawyers and their clients may meet together,
talk in confidence, devise a common strategy where suitable, and
share factual information in those areas where there is mutuality of
interest-all in an effort to advance their mutual defense against the
common impending criminal charges.
Suppose, however, that the prosecutor, as frequently happens, de-
termines the prosecution's interest in securing convictions might best
be advanced by inviting one target of the grand jury investigation into
the government's camp to become a prosecution witness. To convince
one member of the joint defense effort to break ranks with the de-
fense, the prosecutor may tender a favorable plea bargain. A cooper-
ation bargain is struck, and the former member of the joint defense
group will defect to the government's side, becoming a government
witness. The timing of this enticement is up to the prosecutor: it could
occur before indictment, on the eve of trial or sometimes even in the
middle of a trial.19° No one disputes that when one co-defendant
turns into a government witness, the joint defense doctrine operates to
prevent the prosecutor from learning what the co-defendants said in
the joint defense meetings.' 91 The joint defense doctrine prohibits the
government from eliciting joint defense communications of the other
co-defendants from its cooperator. 9
But the question of what the defense can elicit on cross-examina-
tion at trial from the cooperator who defected from the joint defense
group generates constitutional and ethical problems. The lawyers for
the co-defendants may have divided loyalties: a duty not to reveal the
189. Technically, targets of grand jury investigations do not ripen into defendants
and co-defendants until after a charging instrument, such as an indictment, informa-
tion, or complaint, is filed. For the simple purpose of uniformity, however, this Arti-
cle uses the commonly understood term "defendants" even when referring to
preindictment "targets."
190. For example, in the middle of the trial of several co-defendants charged with
bombing the World Trade Center in New York, one co-defendant defected to the
prosecutor's camp to testify as a cooperating government witness. Terrorism in
America, Baltimore Sun, Feb. 11, 1995, at 8A.
191. E.g., Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965).
192. See United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102, 1117 (2d Cir. 1995). In Aidicino,
the court refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when a member of the joint
defense group turned into a government cooperator yet attended a subsequent joint
defense meeting. Id. The court approved the steps the government took "to insulate
the attorneys prosecuting the case from any knowledge gained by [the defector] from
his contacts with the codefendants after he agreed to cooperate." Id. In Aulicino, the
Sixth Amendment should have controlled because indictment had occurred. A Sixth
Amendment claim would attach neither before indictment nor before the co-defend-
ants' first court appearance on the charges. Therefore, any protection for joint de-
fense communications flows not from the Sixth Amendment but from some other
doctrine of confidentiality before indictment.
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witness' joint defense confidences during cross-examination and a
competing duty to defend the client on trial vigorously against the
charges. Many questions remain. Do the lawyers have an actual con-
flict of interest amounting to per se violation of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel? Should the lawyers rep-
resenting the co-defendants on trial be disqualified? If so, would such
a disqualification infringe upon the Sixth Amendment presumption in
favor of retained counsel of choice? 19 3
Although the constitutional guarantee of counsel of choice is a pre-
sumption, 194 not an absolute right, nonetheless it is a right that should
not be minimized in a trial context. For example, in a complicated
white collar criminal prosecution, the lawyer may have invested a
great deal of time, perhaps years, trying to understand the series of
complex transactions that the government deems a fraudulent scheme.
The lawyer will have spent time studying documents, learning the
facts and exploring the pitfalls of the government's case. In the course
of this preparation, the lawyer will have developed a relationship with
the client, a rapport on which the client relies and invests confidence.
The lawyer and the witnesses also may have developed relationships.
The lawyer also may have developed a working relationship with the
prosecutor, which might make access to § 3500195 material come ear-
lier than the court would order or which might result in informal dis-
covery not mandated by the rules."96 The client's psychological need
for continuity of the professional relationship is important. Given the
client, witness, and prosecutor relationships, and knowledge, this law-
yer is without doubt the person best prepared to try the case. To dis-
qualify this lawyer because a co-defendant has turned into a
government witness will have devastating effects on the trial advocacy
and a devastating psychological impact on the client. 197 It could entail
substantial delay while a new lawyer prepares to try the case. The
delay plus the client's demoralization, because of the loss of his law-
yer, may contribute to the client's sense of inevitable doom, rendering
him less willing and capable of assisting the new lawyer in developing
his defense.
In addition, the client who loses his lawyer because a former co-
defendant turns into a government witness is likely to view the crimi-
nal justice system with distrust. Such a client may conclude the trial is
a sham, may feel the deck is unfairly stacked against him, and may not
be willing to mount the rigorous defense our adversary system of jus-
193. Cf. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (discussing limitations of
Sixth Amendment right to choose one's own counsel).
194. See id, 486 U.S. at 159.
195. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994).
196. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 16.
197. For an in-depth discussion of attorney disqualification in white collar criminal
defense cases, see Forsgren, supra note 148.
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tice requires if is to work fairly. Interference with a defendant's coun-
sel of choice should not occur where the defendant has taken the
precaution of retaining a separate lawyer. The defendant has done all
that could be expected of him to avoid conflicts. His choice of counsel
should be protected and respected.
Courts have assumed that the defendant's waiver of the confronta-
tion clause right to full and vigorous cross-examination, based on the
defector's communications to the joint defense group, could cure the
lawyer's conflict of interest. Courts have extracted such a waiver as
the condition for not disqualifying a criminal defendant's counsel of
choice where the lawyer must cross-examine a former member of the
joint defense group.198 This squarely pits the right to confrontation
against the right to counsel of choice.' 99 Compromising cross-exami-
nation impedes the search for the truth.
When faced with the prospect of disqualification of their lawyer be-
cause the lawyer possesses confidences of a defector, some defendants
will knowingly waive their right to conflict-free counsel and agree to
limit the scope of cross-examination. 00 The court is not required,
however, to accept the defendant's waiver of conflict-free counsel and
can disqualify the lawyer at its discretion.20' By entering into a joint
defense arrangement, the defendant appears to have lost control over
retaining his lawyer of choice. Several events beyond the control of
the defendant can combine to deprive the defendant in a joint defense
198. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 158 (discussing the disagreement among the courts of ap-
peals over whether a defendant's waiver of an attorney's conflict of interest may be
overridden); see United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40,45-46 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
attorney cannot cross-examine based on confidential information); United States v.
Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1073 (2d Cir. 1982) (limiting cross-examination to mat-
ters of public record); Forsgren, supra note 148, at 1238 & n.11l.
199. See United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447 (E.D.
Pa. July 30, 1992).
200. McDade, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11447, at *4; see United States v. Anderson,
790 F. Supp. 231, 232 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (limiting cross-examination of government
witnesses who were formerly members of the joint defense group in lieu of disqualify-
ing the lawyers representing the defendant on trial).
201. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162. Wheat involved a case of multiple and successive joint
representation, not a joint defense arrangement; its legal standard for disqualification
may be inapposite. Wheat's disqualification analysis should not be automatically
transposed to the context of a joint defense arrangement when one member defects
and will be cross-examined based on confidential commumcations. In Wheat, the pos-
sible prosecution witness was not only a co-defendant but had had an actual attorney-
client relationship with the lawyer. Ik at 156-57. The rules of professional conduct
indisputably attach. In the case of a joint defense agreement, no ethical obligations
exist under the Code of Ethics between a lawyer and his client's co-defendants who
enter into a joint defense arrangement. Formal Op. 395, supra note 166, at 4-5.
Wheat's disqualification rule should not apply for an even more fundamental reason.
At least in Wheat disqualification of counsel solved the conflict of interest, preserving
the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel Disqualification of counsel, however,
in the context of a joint defense group when one member defects to testify against his
co-defendants cannot solve the problem identified by the courts, preservation of the
putatively confidential information. See infra part IILC.
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group of his lawyer and impair his Sixth Amendment right to present
a defense. These events include: (1) the government inducing,
through a promise of immunity or a plea bargain, a member of the
joint defense group to testify as a prosecution witness; (2) the defect-
ing witness' desire to protect the confidentiality of his statements to
the joint defense group; and (3) the government's motion to disqualify
and the court's rejection of a defendant's knowing waiver of conflict-
free counsel. As the joint defense "privilege" now stands, the right to
counsel of choice can quickly collapse. The defendant's willingness to
waive his constitutional rights to conflict-free counsel and to full cross-
examination may not suffice to prevent the disqualification of counsel.
The defendant should not be required to relinquish the right to coun-
sel of choice. The present construction of the joint defense doctrine,
because it entails a serious risk of counsel disqualification, chills the
formation of joint defense groups. This infringes the defendants'
Sixth Amendment right to pursue a coordinated defense."° Deterring
joint defense groups jeopardizes the balance of the adversary process
and compromises the truth seeking mission of the trial. A system of
rules that recognizes a joint defense privilege to encourage joint de-
fense arrangements but which simultaneously undermines joint de-
fense arrangements by imposing risks of disqualification and denial of
other rights such as confrontation-is internally inconsistent, border-
ing on the incoherent if not the irrational.
A better reasoned conceptualization of the scope of the joint de-
fense privilege can be achieved. Protection for confidential communi-
cations in pursuit of a joint defense need not depend on the attorney-
client privilege. Just because the doctrine protects the confidentiality
of joint defense communications from an adversary, it need not also
preclude the joint defense members from using such communications
to advance their defense if one member defects.
C. Disqualification Is No Solution
Courts have threatened to disqualify the counsel of those joint de-
fense members continuing to trial to preserve the confidences of the
defector who testifies as a government witness. Even if the court dis-
qualifies a co-defendant's lawyer, any attempt to preserve the confi-
dentiality of the government witness' statement has only marginal
chances of success. Disqualification, though costly, may accomplish
little to nothing. After all, the remaining clients in the joint defense
group also may have knowledge of the defecting member's statement.
If the defector's statement would be helpful in securing acquittal, the
remaining defendants can be expected to reveal it to any new lawyer.
The Court will have difficulty preventing an exchange of this informa-
202. See Ass'n B. City N.Y., Interim Report on Joint Defense Agreements, at 12-14
(Nov. 15, 1995) [hereinafter Interim Report].
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tion between the client and new counsel. Indeed, if the information
would present a powerful opportunity to undermine the credibility of
an important witness against the defendant, it is only natural for the
defendant to want to disclose the information to the new lawyer even
though the client knows of a court instruction to the contrary. The
client may not reveal to this new lawyer that the source of this infor-
mation was confidential joint defense communications or may forget
the confidential nature of the source of the information. In addition,
the attorney-client privilege would hinder the court's efforts to dis-
cover whether the source of the information was confidential joint de-
fense communications. Plainly, disqualification of the first lawyer
cannot secure the nonuse of the defector's confidential joint defense
communications whenever they have been shared with the client par-
ticipants in the group. Disqualification may fail to do anything more
than interfere with counsel of choice, eliminate the best prepared per-
son to try the case and increase the costs of the defense.
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE PROTECTION FOR JOINT DEFENSE
COMMUNICATIONS
While joint defense groups are recognized to be important to the
fair defense of a trial with multiple co-defendants, there is significant
uncertainty in the law regarding the specifics of the joint defense privi-
lege. Parties enter into complicated, and perhaps unenforceable,
agreements20 3 to protect the confidentiality of communications shared
203. Some joint defense agreements contain language stating that a joint defense
member who becomes a government witness waives any right to preclude the use, in
his or her cross-examination, of information acquired from the testifying witness
which information the witness gave to the joint defense effort confidentially. Id. at 13.
If the basis for the confidentiality of the joint defense communications is the attorney-
client privilege, such a provision may destroy the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege, subjecting all of the communications to disclosure, not just the communica-
tions of the cooperating witness. The premise of the attorney-client privilege is one of
absolute confidentiality, not contingent confidentiality. Of course, a client may later
choose to waive the confidentiality. Agreeing up front to waive confidentiality if a
specific event occurs is not making disclosure premised on absolute confidentiality
and later changing one's mind to relinquish confidentiality. Since the attorney-client
privilege does not apply unless at the time the communications occurred they were
intended to be kept confidential, it is questionable whether it applies to communica-
tions which clients agree need not be kept confidential if certain events transpire.
Thus, if the attorney-client privilege is the basis for protecting joint defense commu-
nications, contract provisions such as the one outlined above may destroy the applica-
tion of the privilege. It is also questionable whether a contract purporting to require a
waiver over the objection of the person being compelled to waive the attorney-client
privilege would be specifically enforceable should that party change his mind and
refuse to waive the privilege in the event he becomes a testifying prosecution witness
against his former joint defense allies. The public policy supporting the recognition of
the privilege may be undermined if courts were to enforce contract provisions specifti-
cally enforcing a nonrevokable waiver of the privilege.
The fact that parties entering into joint defense agreements are willing to waive the
confidentiality of disclosures should a member become a testifying government wit-
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with co-parties while trying to solve the disqualification and limited
cross-examination questions. 2°
A. Distinguishing Protection for Joint Defense Communications
from the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work
Product Doctrine
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications
made between client and lawyer where the communications are made
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.20 5 Disclosure of such com-
munications to third parties-such as co-defendants or their counsel-
is inconsistent with the traditional confidentiality requirements of the
rule and waives the privilege. An exception is allowed when the dis-
closure to co-defendants or their counsel has occurred in the context
of an agreement to pursue a coordinated defense. This is known as
the joint defense exception to waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege.2 °6 But, it is unclear that the foundation of the joint defense priv-
ilege correctly lies in the attorney-client privilege-which provides207
absolute confidentiality except in very limited circumstances. The
joint defense privilege also protects work product material shared be-
tween members of a joint defense arrangement. The theoretical foun-
dation for protecting communications in the aid of a joint defense may
ness teaches that that limited scope of confidentiality did not adversely influence the
decision to enter into the joint defense arrangement. Confidentiality short of absolute
confidentiality-such as confidentiality until the one who disclosures becomes a testi-
fying prosecution witness-appears sufficient to encourage joint defense arrange-
ments. In other words, it appears that a greater degree of confidentiality is
unnecessary to stimulate the formation of joint defense groups and the exchange of
information. Since that appears so, it is questionable whether absolute confidential-
ity, which is a great hindrance to the factfinder's truth-seeking mission, is the appro-
priate degree of confidentiality to be accorded joint defense communications. The
privilege should not be greater than the scope necessary to effectuate the policies
sought to be advanced, the stimulation of joint defense efforts and those communica-
tions where appropriate.
Another common provision in joint defense agreements is language where the par-
ties agree there shall be no disqualification of counsel if one member defects to testify
for the government and the other lawyers need to cross-examine him. Sample Joint
Defense Agreement at 9 (on file at the Fordham Law Review). Some joint defense
agreements contain language that no attorney-client relationship arises from the joint
defense arrangement, without explaining a basis for the confidentiality of the commu-
nications. Interim Report, supra note 202, at 14.
204. Robert G. Morvillo, Joint Defense Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 3, 1991, at 3.
The scope of the protection should be well enough defined by law to render such
complex agreements unnecessary.
205. See Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
1450, 1503-04 (1985).
206. See Weinstein & Berger, supra note 21, 503(b)[06].
207. The attorney-client privilege will not protect the confidentiality of communica-
tions where the crime-fraud protection applies, where the lawyer and client are en-
gaged in dispute or where multiple clients later are involved in litigation against each
other. See id. 503(b)[04] (discussing the interrelation of attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine).
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also be rooted in that doctrine. To the extent the joint defense "privi-
lege" protects communications occurring directly between a client and
his co-defendant's lawyer, or between two co-defendants in the pres-
ence of defense counsel, the joint defense doctrine protects material
neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine
embraces. 08
1. Comparing the Attorney-Client Privilege to the Joint
Defense Doctrine
In assessing whether to divorce the joint defense doctrine from the
attorney-client privilege, it may be useful to consider some of the dif-
ferences between the two. The attorney-client privilege recognizes,
endorses, and supports a socially esteemed relationship between legal
advisor and client.209 The communications between them are pro-
tected from disclosure for a variety of reasons. The protection is be-
lieved to encourage frank communications, which enable the lawyer
to give legal advice based on sound factual footing. Open communi-
cations produce well-prepared advocates.210 Frank communications
also help secure a more accurate development of facts, weed out weak
claims and defenses, and thereby serve the fair administration of jus-
tice. This is efficient and results in the conservation of judicial re-
sources for claims and defenses that warrant a trial instead of a
settlement.21' The attorney-client privilege respects the privacy of in-
dividuals.2 12 It recognizes the right of individuals to plan their affairs
in an orderly fashion, secure in the knowledge that they have had the
benefits of legal advice.21 3 The attorney-client privilege rests on a be-
lief that in an adversary system, a client's full disclosure is required to
provide skillful advocacy and sound legal advice. The privilege exists
to allow attorneys to assure their clients that the information they give
to their legal advisors will not come back to harm them.2 14 The attor-
ney-client privilege also stimulates greater numbers of people to seek
legal advice in pursuing their plans, and thereby discourages unlawful
activity.21 5 This reduces social wrongdoing. These goals of the attor-
ney-client privilege are achieved independently of the joint defense
208. But see In re Megan-Racine Assocs., Inc.. 189 B.R. 562, 571 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1995) (stating that joint defense privilege can only exist where there is an applicable
underlying privilege as the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine).
209. See 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2291 (1940).
210. Developments in the Law, supra note 205, at 1505.
211. See Deborah S. Bartel, Drawing Negative Inferences upon a Claim of the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege, 60 Brook. L. Rev. 1355, 1367 (1995).
212. James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 Vll. L.
Rev. 279, 332-33 (1963).
213. Developments in the Law, supra note 205, at 1505-07.
214. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Turner & NewaU, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir.
1992).
215. See id.
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doctrine, by the confidentiality afforded to communications between
legal advisor and client.
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, protection for communications
in pursuit of a joint defense does not encourage communications be-
tween the client and his lawyer. The joint defense doctrine encour-
ages different persons to communicate with each other.216 Three
distinct types of communictions are encouraged: (1) communications
between the lawyers for the co-parties; (2) communications between
the clients who are co-parties, if they take place in the presence of
counsel; and (3) communications between a lawyer and other "third
parties having a common interest." '217 The communications between
the client and his own lawyer, however, are already facilitated by the
protection of the traditional attorney-client privilege. The joint
defense doctrine adds nothing to that already stimulated
communication.
The interests served by the joint defense doctrine are distinct from
the interests served by the attorney-client privilege. The joint defense
doctrine exists to preserve fairness in the trial by allowing multiple co-
defendants an opportunity to coordinate their defense instead of be-
ing relegated to the unfair position of presenting inconsistent defenses
without the benefit of allied strategy. In addition to the goal of fair-
ness and balance in the adversary system, the joint defense doctrine
serves the interests of efficiency. Sharing labor reduces the expense of
litigation. Eliminating unnecessarily inconsistent defenses should
shorten a trial's duration and conserve judicial resources. The joint
defense doctrine promotes fairness and efficiency by giving parties ac-
cess to information they otherwise would not have. The joint defense
doctrine, unlike the protection for attorney-client communications,
does not bestow social benefits outside of the litigation. The only in-
terests to be served are those of the litigation process itself.
The joint defense doctrine serves other important goals of fairness.
Multiple co-defendants tried jointly should enjoy the same right as
defendants who are tried separately to present a cohesive defense.
When a single party is made to defend alone, that party inherently has
the ability to present a coherent, consistent, and unified theory of de-
fense. Simple fairness, and the principle that similarly situated per-
sons be treated the same, require that co-defendants tried together
have the same opportunity to present a unified defense.
The joint defense privilege also allows the co-parties to divide re-
sponsibility for factual investigation and prepare the various cross-ex-
aminations. This allocation of responsibility accomplishes two things.
Because each of the lawyers can concentrate his effort on the allo-
216. See Note, Separating the Joint-Defense Doctrine from the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1273, 1279 (1990).
217. See In re Megan-Racine Assocs., Inc., 189 B.R. 562, 571 n.6 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1995).
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cated tasks rather than being spread thin across the board, the defense
case is more thoroughly prepared. Promoting a more prepared case
furthers the goals of the adversary system-which expects truth to
emerge where each side has offered its best case.
The joint defense doctrine restores balance to our adversary system
that would otherwise be lacking in cases involving multiple co-defend-
ants. The imbalance would impede the fairness of the trial contest and
the quest for truth. The restoration of balance serves the interests of
both fairness and truth-seeking. The joint defense doctrine accom-
plishes these social benefits independently of the attorney-client
privilege.
2. Comparing the Joint Defense Doctrine to the Work
Product Doctrine
The core rationale of the work product doctrine 218 is that opposing
counsel should not enjoy free access to an attorney's thought
processes.21 9 This protection extends to an attorney's legal theories,
litigation strategies, trial tactics, impacting on the attorney's methods
of preparing trial information2 20 The work product doctrine provides
a "privileged" area where an attorney "can analyze and prepare his
client's case."'"
The work product doctrine seeks, consistent with the main objective
of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,m" to attain
"privacy for trial preparation to facilitate the adversary system of jus-
tice."'  It is the general thesis of the adversary system that truth
emerges from opposing sides presenting evidence and that this pro-
ceeds best where the opposing sides "competitively develop their own
sources of information." 4 A second rationale supporting the work
product doctrine is one of client protection. It is believed that each
lawyer and litigant requires a zone of privacy in which to function to
pursue the litigant's interests.' z If a lawyer or litigant fears disclosure
of work product, he might forego useful preparation, including
notetaking2 6 Work product immunity entails duplicative effort by
218. Protection for work product, immunizing it from discovery to an adversary,
was first recognized in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and then codified in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b).
219. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511; In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 959 F.2d 1158, 1166-67
(2d Cir. 1992).
220. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
221. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); In re Six Grand Jury Wit-
nesses, 979 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 905 (1993).
222. The work product doctrine applies equally to criminal cases. See Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, ch. 5, Introductory Note at 2 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 1992).
223. Id. § 136 cnt. b.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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opposing sides of investigative effort, thereby resulting in increased
litigation costs, however, the benefits to the adversary system and its
truth seeking mission are believed to outweigh these costs.
Work product immunity is broader than the attorney-client privi-
lege to the extent that it protects more than just communications be-
tween the lawyer and client, for work product includes many other
kinds of material." 7 The protection of the work product doctrine is
not lost by disclosure to a third person,2 8 as is the protection of the
attorney-client privilege. The work product doctrine "protects infor-
mation 'against opposing parties, rather than against all others outside
a particular confidential relationship,"'2 9 and "[c]ounsel may there-
fore share work product, including ideas, opinions, and legal theories,
with [those having] similar interest in fully preparing litigation against
those having a common adversary." 0 Parties conducting a joint de-
fense may share work product without waiving the protection of the
doctrine.
The joint defense doctrine permits the sharing of more than just
work product material. The joint defense doctrine permits both attor-
neys and clients to share with those engaged in the joint defense ef-
fort, either co-defendants or their lawyers, the communications
between them if the communications occurred for the purpose of ad-
vancing the joint defense effort. This sharing of client-lawyer commu-
nications is not permitted by the strict application of the work product
doctrine or the traditional attorney-client privilege. The work product
doctrine is limited to the anticipation of litigation.231 The protection
of the joint defense doctrine has sometimes been extended beyond the
context of litigation. 32
The joint defense doctrine's goal of achieving balance in the adver-
sary process is similar to the goal of the work product doctrine. The
work product doctrine promotes the fairness of an adversary system
by protecting the privacy of the lawyer's mental processes, fact gather-
ing, and encouraging the lawyer's trial preparation. The joint defense
privilege is not concerned with the privacy of lawyers. In fact, it en-
courages the lawyer to disseminate information within certain con-
fined limits, not maintain its privacy. Whereas the two doctrines share
a certain fundamental goal of fairness in the adversary system, they
are distinct in their effort to achieve that goal.
227. See iL cmts. g-i (stating that lawyers, nonlawyers, and expert witnesses all may
be the source of work product protected material).
228. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that the protec-
tion is not "automatically waived" by disclosure to any third party).
229. In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 374, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting
United States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
230. IdL
231. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 515 (D. Conn. 1976).
232. Id. at 514 (holding that common interest could be found in development of
common patent program even if the advice was not focused on pending litigation).
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The joint defense doctrine is less concerned with lawyers' privacy
and operates to protect more than the lawyer's work and mental pro-
cess. The joint defense privilege protects the dissemination of infor-
mation between clients, so long as it occurs in the presence of lawyers,
for the purpose of pursing an agreed-upon common defense 3 It also
protects from discovery communications between a lawyer and his cli-
ent's co-defendant if the communications are pursuant to a joint
defense.231
One feature common to the work product doctrine and the joint
defense doctrine is the degree of confidentiality required to preserve
the protection . 35 Disclosing work product information to a third
party does not necessarily destroy the confidentiality required by the
doctrine. Only disclosure inconsistent with the purpose of the protec-
tion destroys the work product doctrine.3 6 Similarly, the joint de-
fense privilege allows the sharing of information between a client and
his lawyer with third persons who share a common legal interest in an
anticipated or pending litigation. This disclosure is not inconsistent
with the purpose of the protection: to encourage persons with com-
mon legal interests to communicate in pursuit of their common goals.
A disclosure to someone who does not share common legal interests is
inconsistent with the purpose of the privilege.
The joint defense doctrine shares some characteristics of the work
product doctrine. First, the degree of confidentiality that is contem-
plated by the joint defense privilege forbids disclosure of confidential
information to adversaries, but allows the information to be shared
with those who are allied in interest. Second, the joint defense doc-
trine shields ideas, mental impressions, and witness interview informa-
tion from disclosure to adversaries. The information can be shared
only with those allied in interest-but there must be an agreement to
pursue a joint defense before its protection will apply, whereas no cor-
responding agreement is necessary to preserve the protection of the
work product doctrine.3 7
While the joint defense doctrine protects attorney-client communi-
cations and work product, the joint defense privilege is not a simple
amalgamation of the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine. It protects some things that neither the attorney-client privi-
lege nor the work product doctrine protect. For example, if two co-
defendants communicate with a lawyer representing another co-de-
233. United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1989); Hunydee v.
United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965).
234. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833
(1979).
235. See Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), 160 F.R.D. 437,446-49
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
236. See id. at 447-48 (stating that waiver occurs only if disclosure to a third person
substantially increases the likelihood that the material will reach an adversary).
237. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 21, 1 503(b)[06].
1996]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
fendant and the communication is about a common defense, the joint
defense doctrine, not the attorney-client privilege, shields the commu-
nication from disclosure to an adversary.238 A defendant can also
communicate directly with separately represented co-defendants in
the presence of counsel and these communications are protected by
the joint defense doctrine. 39 Neither the attorney-client privilege nor
the work product doctrine protects such communication from an ad-
versary. The joint defense doctrine assures that these communications
are kept confidential from an adversary. Thus, the joint defense doc-
trine protects communications that the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine may require to be disclosed.
B. Reconceptualizing the Protection for Communications in Pursuit
of Matters of Common Interest
In recognizing the joint defense doctrine, courts use an analogy to
the attorney-client privilege as applied to communications shared be-
tween a single lawyer representing multiple clients with common in-
terests.24 ° The analogy may have initially been reasonable, but has
recently raised ethical problems. The distinct benefits and protections
warrant abandoning the attorney-client privilege as the justification
for the protection of joint defense communications. The policy's justi-
fications-preserving fairness and balance in the adversary system
and promoting efficiency in the litigation-are worthy enough to jus-
tify recognition of the protection for joint defense communications in-
dependently of the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine. A theory of the joint defense doctrine should achieve its
goals without violating constitutional rights or placing unfair demands
on lawyers that may foster imbalance in the adversarial system of
justice.241
It is useful to determine whether the protection to be afforded com-
munications in pursuit of matters of common interest should operate
as a privilege or a more qualified doctrine of protection. A privilege,
like the attorney-client privilege, exists to advance social policies be-
yond the litigation context. A judicially administered doctrine of con-
238. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. 381, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
239. Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann v. United States, 768 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir.
1985); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250,253 (5th
Cir. 1977).
240. See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989).
241. For discussions of the joint defense doctrine, see Raymond Banoun & Ronald
G. White, The Joint Defense Privilege and Recent Government Challenges, 9 Corp.
Couns. Q., Oct. 1993, at 71; Capra, Common Representations, supra note 41, at 20;
Marc I. Steinberg & Daniel R. Rogers, The Joint Defense Doctrine in Federal Securi-
ties Litigation, 18 Sec. Reg. LJ. 339 (1991); Patricia Welles, A Survey of Attorney-
Client Privilege in Joint Defense, 35 Miami L. Rev. 321 (1981); Note, Waiver of Attor-
ney-Client Privilege on Inter-Attorney Exchange of Information, 63 Yale L.J. 1030
(1954).
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fidentiality, like the work product doctrine, exists to serve policies
related to the litigation. The protection for joint defense communica-
tions is akin to the latter. The protection should be recognized as a
doctrine, not a privilege. This protection of confidentiality is essen-
tially "a tool of judicial administration, borne out of concerns over
fairness" and designed to protect the balance of the adversary sys-
tem.' 2 It lacks any extrinsic value outside of the litigation context, a
key feature of a "privilege." In this way it more resembles the work
product doctrine, whose value is similarly limited to the litigation
arena, than the attorney-client privilege, whose social benefits extend
beyond a litigation. The protection afforded joint defense communi-
cations should resemble more an immunity from disclosure, which is
qualified, rather than a privilege of the type protected by Rule 501 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Formulating a common defense, when possible, requires communi-
cation. Unless communications are protected from disclosure, de-
fendants will hesitate to coordinate strategy. However, if protection
for these communications comes at the cost of the possible disqualifi-
cation of one's lawyer, the price tag for a coordinated defense may be
too great. This could make co-defendants reluctant to join joint de-
fense groups and, in any event, would impair the honesty of communi-
cation. When joint defense agreements are reduced to writing, they
contemplate that if someone defects, the defector will be cross-ex-
amined on the basis of his communications to the joint defense
group.243 This stipulation does not deter joint defense groups.
The joint defense doctrine should be understood to impress upon
lawyers a fiduciary duty to use the confidences received in a joint de-
fense arrangement only for the joint defense group's defined purpose,
that is to defend the members of joint defense arrangement with re-
spect to the transaction discussed or the proceedings anticipated.
Confidential communications between co-defendants pursuant to a
joint defense arrangement are given with the expectation that the con-
fidential communications will be used by the recipients to defend
themselves against the anticipated charges. Such information should
be received under a duty to keep it confidential, unless it may be used
to advance the agreed upon legal cause of the members of the joint
defense arrangement who are privy to the information. The duty of
confidentiality should require that confidential joint defense informa-
tion be protected from even volunta2T disclosure by fewer than all
members of the joint defense group, except where the information
242. See In re Combustion, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 51, 52 (W.D. La. 1995) (citations
omitted).
243. See Interim Report, supra note 202, at 12-13.
244. One might imagine a scenario where one defendant seeks to raise confidential
communications of another co-defendant on trial to which that co-defendant objects.
See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F2d 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833
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would aid in the defense of the joint defense arrangement. In these
instances, disclosure and use of the communications are not only per-
missible, but expected.
The duty of confidentiality limits the recipient of information, like a
fiduciary, to using the information solely for the purpose for which it
was given. This duty attaches when the information is received. It
should make no difference to the joint defense group that the infor-
mation-giver did not proceed to trial for any reason, including but not
limited to death, the statute of limitations, an absence from the juris-
diction, a failure to be indicted, immunity, a guilty plea, or a guilty
plea coupled with cooperation as a government witness. Nonetheless,
information was given to enable the other members to use it for their
defense. The defector should not be permited to breach the agree-
ment and deny the group the use of information he gave especially
because he may have taken advantage of the information learned
through the joint defense communications, by other co-defendants in
deciding to cooperate with the government. A subsequent event such
as the information-giver becoming a government witness or an event
being brought about by the prosecutor, should not deprive the mem-
bers of the joint defense group of the ability to use the information.
Nor should a defection to the government's side, an event likely initi-
ated by the prosecution, provide a basis to disqualify lawyers of the
defendants who received confidential information from the defecting
member. Nor should it deprive the defense of information that is val-
uable to its defense. To do differently gives the prosecution an undue
tactical advantage.
The fiduciary duty of confidentiality impressed upon joint defense
communications would not be violated by cross-examining a defecting
member who became a testifying government witness and eliciting in-
formation he disclosed in joint defense communications. This con-
struction is faithful to the purpose of the joint defense doctrine and
eliminates the ethical dilemmas that arise when a joint defense mem-
ber becomes a government witness. This reconsideration of the scope
of the protection will not discourage joint defense communications,
and will preserve the vitality of joint defense arrangements and bal-
ance in the adversary process.
Permitting limited use of the confidential communication given in
pursuit of a joint defense group suggests that the protection for joint
defense communications is something more flexible and akin to the
work product doctrine. This construction offers other benefits. It is a
narrower confidentiality doctrine; therefore, more information be-
(1979). The confidentiality given to joint defense communications should not be used
to injure the communicator. In such cases, disclosure should be permitted, but it may
be necessary to sever the case or to use a simultaneous separate jury that does not
hear such evidence.
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comes available to the factfinder. This assists, not impedes, the quest
for truth.245
This understanding of the privilege places no limits on the cross-
examination of the defector who becomes a government witness.
Consequently, the lawyers for the co-defendants on trial are freed
from any conflict of interest in cross-examining the former member of
the joint defense group. At trial, they owe no duty to the cooperating
witness to preserve the confidentiality of his joint defense communica-
tions in cross-examining him. Their duty of loyalty to their clients re-
main intact. Because there is no conflict of interest, no ground for
disqualification arises. As there is no threatened or actual impairment
of the duty of loyalty which the lawyer owes to the client on trial,
there is no violation of the right to conflict-free counsel encompassed
in the Sixth Amendment. The defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to
effective assistance of counsel, confrontation, counsel of choice, and
the pursuit of a joint defense are preserved.
The joint defense arrangement should be governed by rules that
give maximum effect to its separate goals, but not by rules that under-
cut the willingness of co-defendants to enter into joint defense ar-
rangements. The joint defense doctrine needs to operate
independently of the attorney-client privilege.246 First and foremost,
245. There is one further exception to the protection of confidentiality for joint
defense communications that should be recognized in criminal cases. It is an excep-
tion that takes into account the prosecution's legitimate need to discover the prior
statements of its cooperating witness on the subject of his testimony, including state-
ments to his lawyer and to the joint defense group. The government has a special
duty not to call persons to testify without verifying as much as possible about the
truthfulness of the testimony. To do this, it is useful for the prosecution to learn about
their testimony.
246. If the communications given pursuant to a joint defense arrangement are to be
protected independently of the attorney-client privilege, courts must determine
whether such communications deserve protection. Dean Wigmore recognized four
"particularly influential" conditions to establish a privilege. Wigmore, supra note 209,
§ 2285. These conditions center around protecting a socially esteemed relationship:
(1) the communication must originate in confidence; (2) confidentiality must be es-
sential to the willingness of the persons making the communication to speak; (3) the
relationship must be one which the community wishes to foster, (4) the benefits from
nondisclosure must outweigh the benefits that disclosure would bring in securing the
correct disposition of the litigation. Id; see Susan C Rushing, Separating the Joint-
Defense Doctrine from the Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 Tex. L Rev. 1273, 1286-88
(1990).
The first criterion is satisfied by joint defense communications as long as the only
persons privy to the communications are the co-parties with common interest and
their respective lawyers. The communications cannot be shared with anyone who is
not part of the joint defense effort. The presence of persons not part of the joint
defense group will destroy the confidentiality requirement.
The second criterion is present in joint defense communications. The parties, in
both civil and criminal cases, would not voluntarily reveal information that could in-
jure their legal position. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment privilege which protects an
individual against self-incrimination blocks formal discovery in matters that might
tend to expose a person to criminal liability. See Robert Heidt, The Conjurer's Cir-
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the joint defense arrangement needs to be freed from the ethical dis-
qualification rules that properly govern a genuine attorney-client rela-
tionship.247 Joint defense arrangements do not create attorney-client
relationships and should not be treated as such. 48
cle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 Yale L.J. 1062 (1982). Only
upon a guarantee of confidentiality or immunity would a lawyer allow a client with a
valid Fifth Amendment privilege to speak to others, even if only to advance their
mutual legal interests. Without the promise of confidentiality, the speaker is unlikely
to disclose because his words might work to his detriment.
Wigmore's third criterion is also satisfied. The web of interrelationships between a
lawyer, his client, and his client's co-parties, and the lawyers for the co-parties-when
they are working together to pursue a matter of common legal interest-is worthy of
societal esteem and protection for the purpose of facilitating the litigation. Coordina-
tion among co-parties and lawyers promotes balance in our adversarial system, pre-
vents unnecessarily inconsistent defenses, and reduces the costs of litigation by
allowing a division of labor among co-parties' lawyers. Coordination also allows for
better factual and legal preparation.
Wigmore's fourth criterion, a cost/balancing test, also supports recognizing the joint
defense doctrine. The communications allow coordination which in turn allows the
multitude of societal benefits outlined immediately above. In addition, construing the
joint defense doctrine as offering confidentiality to joint defense communications, ex-
cept to the extent that the recipients of the information may use it to defend them-
selves in connection with the transactions or proceedings the joint defense group
anticipated, can be achieved with lower costs than applying the attorney client privi-
lege's impenetrable confidentiality requirement. This construction impedes the
search for truth less than a construction like the attorney-client privilege because it
allows the factfinder greater access to information.
247. In federal court, the law governing disqualification of counsel because of con-
flict of interest is governed by federal standards, not the code of ethics adopted by the
state court of the state in which the federal court sits. See Wheat v. United States, 486
U.S. 153, 161 (1988).
Many state courts use the substantial relationship test when deciding whether to
disqualify counsel. Under the substantial relationship test, the former client need
only show that the matters in the pending case are substantially related to matters in
which the lawyer previously represented the former client. "The [clourt will assume
that during the course of the former representation [client] confidences were dis-
closed to the attorney bearing on the subject matter" and the court will not inquire
into the extent of the disclosure. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see Zador Corp., N.V. v. Kwan, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 1995).
A more complicated situation occurs in a civil matter when a lawyer defends an
adversary of a party who was also a co-party and member of a joint defense arrange-
ment of that lawyer's former client. In this situation the threshold question is whether
the two matters are substantially related. If so, application of the substantial relation-
ship test may require disqualification. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco
Steel Corp. 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing the possibility of disqualifica-
tion using the substantial relationship test). But see Trner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 896 F. Supp. 651, 654 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (denying motion to disqualify counsel
despite fact that counsel's former law firm previously represented co-defendant).
248. Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1247 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1125
(1994); Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 654. Courts analyzing disqualification motions in the
joint defense arrangement context have, to date, applied the disqualification stan-
dards laid down in Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160-64. See United States v. Anderson, 790 F.
Supp. 231 (W.D. Wash. 1992); United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11447, at *7-9 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992) (considering disqualification in a joint
defense arrangement where one defendant defected to the Government's camps to
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Overall, the benefits of recognizing the joint defense doctrine inde-
pendently of the attorney-client privilege greatly outweigh the costs of
confidentiality. Even where the joint defense communications are
protected from disclosure, the protection is not especially costly be-
cause it does not preclude discovery of the underlying facts of the
transaction. In this way its operation would be similar to the attorney-
client privilege. In criminal cases, the application of the joint defense
privilege imposes no additional burden on the prosecution, which is
already precluded by the Fifth Amendment from compelling discov-
ery from the defendants. A balancing scale tips in favor of protecting
testify as a government witness). Wheat, however, did not involve a joint defense
arrangement, but rather, involved a case of multiple and successive representations.
Wheat's disqualification standards require a court to: (1) secure any ethical duties
owed to a government witness or co-defendant and (2) protect a client's right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel, which might be compromised by a lawyer's conflict of inter-
est. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160-61. In addition, Wheat entrusted the district court to
evaluate "the facts and circumstances of each case." Id. at 164. Wheat permits a court
to disqualify a defendant's lawyer despite the defendant's knowing and intelligent
waiver of conflict-free counsel. Id. at 162-63. Although Wheat's rule may be applica-
ble to disqualification motions in a joint defense context, its operation should be dif-
ferent where the disqualification motion grows out of a joint defense arrangement.
Wheat involved a case of genuine attorney-client relationships and involved questions
of multiple representation of the criminal co-defendants by a single lawyer. E.g.,
Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984); Unites States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d
742 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991); United States v. Kenney, 911 F.2d 315
(9th Cir. 1990); United States v. James, 708 F2d 40 (2d Cir. 1983); Gary T. Lowenthal,
Successive Representation by Criminal Lawyers, 93 Yale L.I. 1 (1983); Peter W. Tague,
Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 Geo. LJ. 1075
(1979); Forsgren, supra note 148, at 1237-39.
Moreover, if the joint defense privilege protects the confidentiality of communica-
tions, except that such communications may be used by the recipients to defend them-
selves against the transaction or charges anticipated by the joint defense group, then
Wheat's disqualification standards do not favor disqualification when one member
switches sides. Such an understanding of the joint defense doctrine recognizes implic-
itly that the joint defense arrangement itself does not create a new attorney-client
relationship. Hence, the joint defense group itself creates no duty of loyalty running
from a lawyer to a co-defendant of the lawyer's client. Also, because there is no new
attorney-client relationship established, any confidentiality requirement arises from
the joint defense doctrine itself rather than from an attorney-client relationship or the
attorney-client privilege. Wheat's requirement that the ethical duties to the govern-
ment witness be secured, would not warrant disqualification when the duty of confi-
dentiality owed to the defecting member does not include a duty on the part of the
remaining joint defense members to refrain from cross-examining the defector in a
proceeding anticipated by the joint defense group, based on the defector's communi-
cations to the joint defense group.
Because there would be no duty to the cooperating witness not to cross-examine
him based on his confidential communications to the joint defense group, a lawyer
representing a co-defendant on trial would not face a conflict of interest. Therefore,
Wheat's requirement that a court protect a client's right to effective assistance of
counsel would not trigger disqualification because there is no conflict of interest that
impairs the effectiveness of counsel for the co-defendant on trial.
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communications among co-parties and their lawyers on matters of
common legal interests. 49
In sum, the joint defense doctrine should treat the recipients of the
joint defense communications, lawyers and clients alike, as fiduciaries
entrusted with an asset-information. Fiduciary duty obliges "the fi-
duciary to act in the best interests of his client or beneficiary and to
refrain from self-interested behavior not specifically allowed. 250
Viewed as fiduciaries, the members of a joint defense effort who re-
ceive information from one another have an obligation not to use the
information given to them in a manner inconsistent with the purpose
for which it was entrusted to them. They cannot use it as a sword to
injure the legal position of the information-giver but they can use it as
a shield to advance their legal cause in a particular proceeding. No
other use or disclosure would be consistent with their undertakings.
Thus, recipients of the communications in a joint defense effort are
like fiduciaries, who must protect the confidentiality of the informa-
tion from disclosure to the outside world, except to the extent the re-
249. The balancing scale might tip differently when it is applied to determine
whether communications are protected from subsequent use in other proceedings be-
tween the parties making the communications. Ordinarily, in the attorney-client priv-
ilege context, communications are not deemed confidential when the communicators
stand in an adverse position to each other as opposing parties in litigation. Certainly,
one member of the joint defense group testifying against former co-defendants does
not satisfy that standard of adversity. But criminal co-defendants, and certainly civil
co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, could conceivably end up in litigation against one an-
other and seek to use the other's confidential communications or his own confidential
communications to the group.
The question arises whether the joint defense doctrine should bar or allow the ad-
mission of statements. On the one hand, it is virtually impossible to stop parties from
using information they have in their possession. Denying parties the use of informa-
tion they already have damages the public's opinion of the fairness and truth-seeking
value of the litigation process. Limiting use inter sese may serve to make parties un-
willing to accept an adverse decision because it was rendered on information less
complete than they possess and a party may feel she did not have her full day in court.
On the other hand, if parties know the communications can be used inter sese this
will chill the frankness of any communications, undermining considerably the poten-
tial value the communications could offer the parties, the lawsuit, and the administra-
tion of justice. This is a particular risk in civil lawsuits where co-parties communicate
regarding a matter of common legal interest because the threat of cross claims, subse-
quent lawsuits for contribution, or other legal disputes between those allied on the
present legal matter is real. Although parties might argue that use of confidential
communications in proceedings inter sese has the potential to chill frank communica-
tions, this argument requires further refinement. The solution perhaps could depend
on whether the party seeking to use the other's confidential communication is doing
so as a shield to protect himself or as a sword to harm the maker of the statement.
The latter is surely inconsistent with the protection of the privilege. The former use is
easier to accept, in part because a party is entitled to fairness and in part because a
party, who has knowledge that he could use his own statement or the statement of the
other to protect himself in a subsequent proceeding against his present ally, does not
have the same incentive to be guarded in his communications as he would have if his
own statement could be used as a sword against him.
250. Alison G. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate
Structure, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 738, 760 (1978).
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cipients use the information to prepare, coordinate and execute a
defense against the legal charges contemplated or pending. Viewed in
this way, the communications can be used to advance the defense, by
cross-examining the defector who turned government witness. Under
these circumstances no grounds for disqualification arise.
CONCLUSION
Joint defense groups are important to the fair functioning of the
adversary system. The joint defense doctrine should be recognized as
an independent doctrine. It enables co-defendants who agree to pur-
sue matters of common interest to communicate information to one
another and to each other's lawyers confidentially, to pool and dis-
tribute labor, and to coordinate a defense strategy of the case. This
eliminates the likelihood that the several co-defendants will mount
unnecessarily inconsistent theories of defense at trial, which would
work to the detriment of the credibility of all. Coordination of effort
is efficient, saves labor, reduces the expense of defending, and con-
serves valuable court time. Coordinated effort mounts the strongest
attack on the prosecution's evidence, putting the government's evi-
dence to a vigorous test. Coordinated defenses protect the constitu-
tional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. A joint defense
doctrine that promotes joint defense groups helps the defense present
its best case, providing necessary balance to the adversarial system.
Joint defense groups are impeded by treating this doctrine of confi-
dentiality stimulating joint defense communications as part of the at-
torney-client privilege. This bars cross-examing defectors about their
joint defense communications and requires either foregoing of the
cross-examination based on the communication or disqualification of
counsel. The spectre of disqualification chills joint defense groups
from forming, contrary to the goal of the joint defense doctrine. The
joint defense members who stand trial must be permitted to cross-
examine a former member who has switched sides to become a testify-
ing prosecution witness using the defector's communications to the
joint defense group. Otherwise, the change in heart brought about by
the prosecution unfairly deprives the defense of information and
threatens to disqualify counsel. Receipients of joint defense commu-
nications should be required as fiduciaries not to misuse the informa-
tion, to protect its confidentiality to the outside world, except to the
extent the information is used for the purpose it was given, to defend
against the jointly anticipated legal matter.
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